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 )CIBARA( TCARTSBA SISEHT
 يحًذ أفضم بياباني الاســــــــــــــــى:
 إستر اتيجياث انًسايذة نشركاث خذياث انتىزيع في أسىاق انكهرباء عنىاٌ انرسانت:
 انهنذست انكهربائيت انتخصـــــــــص:
 2201 ديسًبر تاريـخ انتخــرج:
شركات تزوٌد الطاقة الكهربائٌة فً سوق الكهرباء الى فائدة المستهلكٌن، وشجعها على استخدام تقنٌات مختلفة  أدى تنافس
بهدف زٌادة الأرباح. ٌنتج عن غٌاب مشاركة جانب الطلب فً السوق قفزات فً الأسعار، عجز، وممارسات سوق الطاقة. 
لتً تؤدي الى أسعار مثالٌة، والذي بدوره ٌضمن بعض الفوائد تدرس هذه الاطروحة أثر جانب الطلب فً سوق الكهرباء وا
 كتقلٌل جانب التزوٌد الكلً، ومقاربة الأسعار فً جانب الطلب الى الطلب فً الأوقات الحرجة. 
تم فً هذه الأطروحة تطوٌر استراتٌجٌة مزاودة مثالٌة لخدمة الحمولة الكائنة، لصندوق مشترك لمزاد ذو جانبٌن فً سوق 
الكهرباء والذي ٌغطً نموذجٌن. بٌنما ٌتجاهل النموذج الأول تأثٌر شروط النقل، ٌأخذ النموذج الثانً تأثٌر شروط النقل على 
ٌن الاعتبار. فً هذا السوق،تم استخدام المزاد المغلق حٌث الاتفاق وفق الدفع حسب الربح لخدمة الحمولة الكائنة فً ع
المزاٌدة، وبروتوكولات مزاٌدة على مراحل. تم تمثٌل سلوك المزاٌدة للمنافسٌن بمتغٌرات عشوائٌة تتبع التوزع الطبٌعً 
كارلو" -تم حله باستخدام "محاكاة مونتًالإحصائً. ثم تم تشكٌل المعضلة وفق نموذج أمثلة عشوائً متعدد الأهداف، و
وخذياث انذًونت انكائنت بذوٌ ششوط اننقم  socneGوالخوارزمٌات الجٌنٌة. تم عرض المثال العددي الذي ٌتضمن 
(اننًورج الأول) لايضاح انخصائص الأساسيت نهنًورج وانطشيقت انًقخشدت. شًم هزا انبذث أيضا عهى دساست آثاس 
، الأسعاس انقابهت نهًقاطعت، يعايم انخشابظ، عايم انخطش، وانًزايذة الأداديت في انودذة انزينيت. أسعاس انبيع انًفشق
 نظاو اننقموأخيشا، حى عشض حأثيش ششوط اننقم في اسخشحيجيت انًزايذة نخذيت انذًونت انكائنت عشضج باسخخذاو 
أن  وقد وجد .انكائنت. كًا حى حزويذ أثش انعقود انعاجهت عهى سبخ خذيت انذًونت 03-EEEI
 .خدمة الكٌان لتحمٌل اختٌار هً أفضل العقود الآجلة مع وحدة زمنٌة استراتٌجٌة كتلة فً عطاءات ثلاثة
 درجت انًاجستير في انعهىو
 جايعت انًهك فهذ نهبترول وانًعادٌ
انظهراٌ، انًًهكت انعربيت انسعىديت ديسًبر 2201
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction to Competitive Electricity Markets 
 
During most of twentieth century, consumers used to buy electrical energy from a utility 
that holds the monopoly for the supply of electricity services in the franchise area. In the 
1980s, some economists argued that the monopolistic electric utilities remove the 
incentive to operate efficiently and encouraged unnecessary investments. The economists 
suggested that if companies were allowed to compete freely for the provision of 
electricity that may benefit consumers.  Competing companies would choose different 
technologies in order to maximize their profit and hence the consumers would less likely 
be saddled with the consequences of unwise investments. Thus the introduction of 
competition in the supply of electricity has been accompanied by deregulation and hence 
privatization of some or all components of the industry[1] .  
In an open access electricity market, the price of electricity is determined by the 
Independent System Operator (ISO) or Market Operator (MO) for specific intervals 
during a specific period considering various economical and operational factors. This 
results in uncertainty in electrical market price. In „Fake Markets‟, generators bid to 
supply a fixed amount of a power and the market clearing price is set by the marginal 
 2   
 
price of the most expensive generator scheduled to serve the forecasted load where as 
demand side does not contribute in the price setting process.  When both suppliers and 
consumers are allowed to operate freely in a competitive market, the intersection of 
supply and demand curves gives the Market Clearing Price (MCP). The profit obtained 
from this competition will be then optimal. This type of market is called a “Real 
Competitive Power Market”. If Demand side participation does not respond to the 
dynamic wholesale prices, generators would have no incentive to bid closer to their 
marginal cost in the electricity markets and so prices could not be set closer to the 
perfectly competitive market price. The absence of Demand Side Participation (DSP) in 
electricity markets may cause the price spikes, shortages, and exercises of market 
power[2, 3].  
Once the Demand Side participates into the market it forms a Double-Sided competitive 
electricity market where in suppliers and consumers submit their supply and demand bids 
in a sealed format to the independent system operator. The ISO then constructs the hourly 
aggregated supply offers and demand bids and determines the Market Clearing Price 
(MCP) and correspondingly supply and demand schedules. The winners of the market 
will be paid (or) pay the MCP for each MW of electric power supplied (or) purchased in 
the market. The main aim of the Suppliers and Load Serving Entities (LSEs) in the 
market is to maximize their profit. The LSEs under double-sided competitive electricity 
market environment are required to compete with the rivals by bidding into the market 
and hence to a certain extent the profits of LSEs depend on their bidding strategies. Thus, 
it is important for LSEs to construct an optimal bidding strategy in order to maximize 
their profit. The main factors which affect the bidding behavior are the demand variation, 
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regulatory constraints; and the bidding behavior of other competitors. Due to special 
nature of electricity the most uncertain factor is the rivals bidding behavior that 
compounds the difficulties in bidding decision process where each player tries to 
maximize their own profits[4]. 
Now, the challenge is how to develop optimal bidding strategies for LSEs. There have 
been several approaches which were proposed to build optimal bidding strategy. The first 
approach is to estimate the Market Clearing Price (MCP) in the next period. The second 
approach is based on game theory and the third is based on the estimation of bidding 
behaviors of the rivals participating in the electricity market. Out of these approaches, 
most of the research to develop optimal bidding strategy is done using the third approach. 
Here the LSEs make use of the available information about rivals such as historical 
bidding data and forecasted load data and then estimate the rivals bidding behavior. LSEs 
face many risks while adopting bidding strategies. If the bidding price is too low then 
there is a risk of not clearing the quantity required which reduces the profit of selling 
electric power to end customers. If the bidding price is too high, then there is a risk of 
paying unnecessary prices for purchasing electricity and end customers may look for 
another LSEs due to high retail prices[5].  
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1.2 Thesis Motivation 
The main purpose of the research is to study how the Demand Side participation affects 
the electricity market without and with transmission constraints. Once the Demand side 
participates into the electricity, what should be the approach to construct an optimal 
bidding strategy for LSEs so as to maximize its profit which is affected by the rivals 
bidding behavior and various risk factors? Also how congestion effects on the feasibility 
of power flow and how should LSEs tackle the problem of congestion? It is necessary to 
find out how the contractual tools are beneficial to manage risks associated with 
congestion and whether they affect the benefits of LSEs. All these questions warrant a 
study about demand side participation and construction of an optimal bidding strategy for 
LSEs. 
 An optimal bidding strategy for LSEs is developed for a pool based double-sided auction 
electricity market with two models. The first model neglects the effect of transmission 
constraints whereas the second model takes into account the impact of transmission 
constraints on the profit of LSEs. The bidding behaviors of rivals are represented as 
stochastic variables of normal probability distributions. The problem is then formulated 
as a multi-objective stochastic optimization model and solved by a Monte-Carlo 
Simulation and Genetic Algorithm (GA). A numerical example involving Generation 
companies (Gencos) and LSEs without transmission constraints is used to illustrate the 
essential features of the proposed model and method. The impact of transmission 
constraints on bidding strategy of LSE is studied using IEEE-30 bus system. The thesis 
also includes the effect of forward contracts on the profit of LSE.  
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1.3  Thesis Objectives 
 
1. To study different bidding options for Load Serving Entity using single block 
bidding per unit time with correlation coefficient. 
2. To study different bidding options for Load Serving Entity using three blocks 
bidding per unit time with correlation coefficient. 
3. To develop an optimal bidding strategy for LSE with risks in pool-based double-
sided competitive electricity. 
4. To study the impact of transmission constraints on bidding options for LSE 
considering single and three block bidding per unit time with correlation 
coefficient tested on IEEE 30 bus system. 
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1.4 Thesis Organization 
 
This thesis is organized as follow 
In the second chapter of the thesis, a literature survey is presented on the basic concepts 
of electricity markets. These concepts discuss what the electricity markets consists of and 
how the electricity markets are run. Different pricing schemes of electricity markets are 
discussed along with different market clearing processes and settlements. The chapter 
also presents a literature survey on Demand Side Participation (DSP). This study 
discusses the importance of DSP within the electricity markets and its effects on the 
market. Accomplishment of DSP with respect to retailers and consumers perspective is 
discussed. A literature review on the impact of transmission constraints on the electricity 
markets is also documented in this chapter. A short discussion about nodal pricing and 
losses in transmission networks is presented. It also discusses about various techniques 
used to manage the transmission risks in centralized electricity markets. Finally, the 
chapter discusses the various approaches of bidding strategies for electricity market 
participants. 
 
Chapter three presents a mathematical model for optimal strategic bidding for LSEs in 
double-sided competitive electricity markets is constructed using Y independent 
Generation Companies (Gencos) and Z independent LSEs. The chapter also documents a 
literature review on Monte-Carlo Simulation and Genetic Algorithm (GA) methods. 
Finally, the procedure for building an optimal bidding strategy for an LSE is documented 
with a flowchart.  
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Chapter four is divided into two parts. The first part presents the simulation analysis of 
constructing bidding strategy of a market model consisting of 3 Gencos and 4 LSEs 
without considering transmission constraints. Various bidding scenarios based on risk 
factors, correlation co-efficient, retail price to end customers and interruptible price to 
end customers are analyzed. Monte-Carlo Simulation and Genetic Algorithm (GA) are 
the two mathematical tools used to determine the optimal bidding strategy for a LSE. The 
second part presents the simulation analysis of an electricity market model which takes 
into account the impacts of transmission constraints. The IEEE-30 bus system model is 
used for the study. The system will be assumed to consist of 6 Gencos and 3 LSEs. At 
first, an Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is conducted without considering the transmission 
constraints. Secondly, OPF with transmission constraints is performed and the impact of 
transmission constraints on the electricity model is studied along with its impact on the 
profit of concerned LSE. Finally, an optimal bidding strategy for IEEE- 30 bus system 
model is developed using Monte-Carlo Simulation and GA. 
 
Chapter 5 includes Conclusion and Future Work. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature review is divided into the following categories: At first, a survey on the 
electricity markets and pricing settlements will be discussed and secondly, the role of 
demand side participation and its importance in electricity markets is documented.  The 
impact of transmission constraints on electricity markets is discussed and the managing 
of transmission constraints is documented. Finally, a literature survey on the strategic 
bidding approaches for market participants in an electricity market is presented. 
2.1 Introduction 
The electricity markets are based on the premise that electricity can be treated as a 
commodity. However, there are many differences between electricity and other 
commodities. The basic difference is that electrical energy is connected to a physical 
system which functions faster than any other market[6]. This physical system consists of 
generation, transmission, distribution and utilization. The generation and load should 
always be balanced else it would result in the collapse of the system. Such collapses are 
not tolerable as it stops not only the trading system but also the entire region goes without 
power for long periods. The other difference between electricity and other commodity is 
that the power generated by one generator cannot be specified to a particular consumer. It 
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has to be pooled since „the electrical energy produced by different generators is 
indistinguishable‟. This pooling is very economic. The load in the electricity markets 
varies hourly, daily and weekly. This variation in the load has to be met with time to 
time[7, 8]. 
Considering all the factors mentioned above, there is a need of an electricity market 
where in sellers and buyers interact without any interruption. Buyers and sellers interact 
based on the equilibrium in which market clears at a price where supply equals demand. 
The next section presents how the electrical energy trade is organized and the functioning 
of open electricity markets. 
2.2  Open Electricity Markets 
2.2.1  Bilateral Trading 
This type of trading is only between two parties (sellers and buyers). These two parties 
set the price of the transaction independently. Hence there is no official price involved[9]. 
E. Bompard and M. Yuchao addressed the various types and modelling of bilateral 
trading as [10].  
2.2.2 Electricity Pools 
Electricity pools involve a centralized trading of electrical energy where in sellers 
(generators) and buyers (consumers) submit their offers and bids at a certain price for the 
period. Independent System Operator (ISO) or Market Operator (MO) then ranks the 
offer prices of sellers in ascending order and constructs a curve as a function of bid 
quantity. This curve is called supply curve. In a similar way ISO or MO constructs a 
curve as a function of bid quantity by ranking the bid prices of buyers in descending 
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order. This curve is known as demand curve. As shown in figure 2.1, „the intersection of 
this supply and demand curves determines the market equilibrium‟. The accepted bids 
and offers are called the winners of the market. The winners of the market are informed 
about the amount of energy they can supply or draw from the market. The advantage of 
this type of trading is „centralized form of management‟. It not only handles the 
transactions of electrical energy but also the transmission system responsibility [11-13]. 
 
Figure ‎2.1 Market Clearing Process 
2.3  Electricity Pricing 
The issue of electricity price forecasting has become very essential for utilities in order to 
make decisions, plan bidding strategies, scheduling and for reliable operations [14]. 
Forecasting of electricity market prices is difficult because these prices are highly volatile 
than other financial markets. The reason of high volatility is due to the fact that electrical 
supply and demand, unlike other commodities, should be on real-time balance. The other 
reasons for volatility in electricity market prices may be due to fuel prices, generation 
 11   
 
problem, transmission constraints, weather problems, bidding strategies of market 
players, losses etc. There are two methods developed by researchers to forecast these 
prices [15]. The first method is „Analysis-based‟ which makes use of the historical data 
of market participants to forecast the future electricity market price. The second method 
is „Simulation-based‟ which makes use of system operation internal data like initial 
offers, constraints of operating system and demand bids to forecast the market price. This 
method is generally used by market operators and large power utilities. This method is 
not practical as it requires the internal data of the system under operation. 
The profit of utilities depends upon the strategy of providing the required energy with 
right price at right time [16]. The various pricing methods used in the electricity markets 
are 
Market Clearing Price (MCP): If there are no transmission constraints in a system then 
MCP is determined by offers and bids submitted by generators and consumers. It‟s the 
only price for the entire market system.  
When transmission constraints are considered the following types of pricing are used 
Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP): It is the cost of supplying „next MW of load‟ to a 
specific location. It takes into account the marginal cost of generation, cost of losses and 
cost of transmission congestion. Optimal power flow (OPF) with transmission constraints 
is conducted to balance the demand at different buses and to determine LMP. LMP is 
different at different buses. It is also known as „Nodal Pricing‟ (NP). 
Zonal Market Clearing Price (ZMCP): This type of pricing comes into picture when 
ISO detects congestion along a transmission path in a zone for a given period. ISO then 
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adjusts the zonal scheduling at the two ends of transmission path which relieves the 
congestion. Thus, a new MCP is determined by OPF at the two ends of the path known as 
ZMCP. 
2.4 Settlement Methods in Electricity Markets 
The settlements for market winners in electricity markets are done based on the rules 
agreed by all market participants. There are two such rules which are economic‟ i.e.  
• Uniform Pricing Rule: Bidders submit sealed bids and MO constructs supply-
demand curves and determines market clearing price at which supply equals 
demand. Market winners are paid a price according to MCP. 
•   Discriminatory Pricing Rule (Pay-As-Bid): Bidders submit sealed bids and 
MO constructs supply-demand curves and determines market clearing price at 
which supply equals demand. Market winners are paid a price according to their 
bids. 
There are various uniform pricing options that are used in electricity markets based on 
offers and bids of suppliers and consumers. They are as follows 
2.4.1 Last Accepted Offer (LAO) or First Rejected Offer (FRO): 
If the demand is inelastic then auction is only adopted for the supply. The supply offers 
are then ranked in increasing order by the ISO and the energy is dispatched at a point 
where ranked offers satisfy the demand. Here, the market uniform pricing can be settled 
either to LAO or FRO. If the energy is dispatched at a point where the block of offer is 
marginally accepted then this block will be the last accepted block and its price will be 
the block price of the offer [17].  
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Figure 2.2 shows uniform pricing options for supply side. 
 
Figure ‎2.2 Uniform Clearing Prices by supply-side 
2.4.2 Last Accepted Bid (LAB) or First Rejected Bid (FRB) 
When the supply is inelastic the auctions are only for demand. The demand bids are then 
ranked in decreasing order with respect to their price by ISO. The energy is dispatched at 
a point where demand is satisfied as shown in figure 2.3. Here, the market clearing price 
can be settled to either Last Accepted Bid (LAB) or First Rejected Bid (FRB) [17, 18]. 
 
Figure ‎2.3 Uniform Clearing Prices by Demand-side 
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2.4.3 Double-Sided Auction Electricity Market      
  
For double-sided auctions in electricity markets, the supply offers and demands bids are 
ranked in ascending and descending order respectively until the offer price exceeds the 
bidding price i.e. until demand is satisfied. Figure 2.4 shows the various uniform pricing 
options used in double sided competitive electricity markets. The uniform price can be set 
to any value between bid-offer gaps as shown in the figure 2.4. This settlement would be 
satisfactory for all the market participants. In case of partially cleared block, set this 
partial cleared block price as uniform price. This block can be either an offer or a bid [18, 
19].   
 
Figure ‎2.4  Uniform Clearing Prices under double-sided auction electricity markets 
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2.5 Demand Side Participation (DSP) 
Electricity prices in fake markets are decided by the supply side participation. For a 
competitive market, demand side should also be involved to decide the electricity price. 
This type of involvement of both supply and demand sides is possible in real market as 
mentioned in section 2.4.3. In general, the „fully competitive electricity market‟ should be 
open for not only generation companies but also for demand entities. It has been 
documented through research that Demand Side Participation (DSP) makes system 
reliable and optimal. In china the participation of demand side has provided the fast 
progress of power industry reconstruction [20-22].  
2.5.1 Definition of DSP 
One can understand from Demand Side Participation that it is done in order to 
communicate between “wholesale and retail electricity markets” having an objective of 
changing the loads depending upon the wholesale electricity price and the load 
requirement area. There are many ways to define DSP, but its basic function is to make 
the system reliable and profitable to both supply and demand side participants. DSP 
encourages customer to reduce their consumption during the period of high price and 
receive incentives for their participation. 
DSP is not only confined to electricity market but also has other applications like 
ancillary services, reserves and quality control [23-25]. 
The participation of demand side in electricity are for different purposes like price setting 
in electricity markets or contracts, easing transmission constraints of a network, market 
balancing and ancillary services.  
 16   
 
2.5.2 Importance of DSP 
The effective response of electricity customers is important for following reasons [26-28] 
a. During critical periods of supplying the demand, the active DSP reduce the price 
spikes. 
b. The reduction in the demand by DSP during critical periods brings the market to a 
reliable position by reducing supply from highly expensive generators. 
c.  When there is an insufficient supply, load shedding can increase system 
reliability. 
d. Regulation and spinning reserves may be provided by load which results in low 
cost. 
Demand response benefits in the improvement of electricity production resource 
efficiency. The increased efficiency has variety of benefits as follows: [29].  
1. It creates a sum of amount to benefit the power plants to use the most “costly-to-
run power plants” during the periods of „high demand‟. This drives the prices 
down for all wholesale electricity purchasers. 
2. Customers may earn financial benefits in the form of „incentive payments‟ by 
adjusting their demand with respect to time-varying electricity rates and 
participants may earn benefits by bill savings. 
3. Demand response reduces financial costs and inconvenience to customers by 
reducing consequences of forced outages. This results in operational security and 
adequacy savings. 
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4. „Market performance benefits‟ i.e. demand response mitigates suppliers‟ ability to 
exercise market power by raising power prices. 
2.6 Accomplishment of Demand-Side Participation within Competitive Electricity 
Markets 
The accomplishment of Demand Side Participation in electricity market can be studied in 
the form of two perspectives. 
2.6.1 Retailer’s‎Perspective 
Retailers should be able to forecast its load behavior and should also be able to predict 
future average electricity prices accurately in order to balance risks associated with 
buying energy between forward contracts and volatile spot markets and offer consumers 
appropriate retail supply contracts. The problem of optimal purchase can be addressed by 
using a stochastic optimization method to purchase allocation-problem for “long-term 
forward market and short-term spot market”. Based on the optimal purchase allocation, a 
method is developed for generating demand-side bids [30]. 
A retailer would ideally like to balance power, it purchased from the day-ahead market or 
by using long-term contracts, exactly with the consumer‟s demand. Due to random 
consumption behavior of demand this situation is not possibly achieved which imposes 
risks on the retailer. The retailer is thus forced to sell the imbalanced power on the spot 
market. The imbalances handling by retailer represents risks as the electrical energy price 
on the spot market is volatile. To avoid such risks, a retailer should forecast the demand 
of its customer precisely which is impossible. The retailer must classify its customers into 
groups having same load profiles and then identity groups and their dependence on 
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meteorological and temporal factors [31, 32]. Also a retailer can focus its efforts in 
marketing toward high profitable customers by predicting load profiles of these 
customers on the basis of its type of its load factor, industrial activity, and its annual 
energy consumption [33]. 
2.6.2 Customer’s‎Perspective 
Consumers subscribe DSP programs due to financial benefits that they can realize from 
these programs. These programs involve a chain of decisions both before and after 
subscribing to a DSP option. Benefits like reduced forced outages may also motivate 
consumers to take part into a DSP option. The decision of a consumer to respond to DSP 
programs depends on the benefits that the consumer can derive from its participation, the 
amount of load its able to modify and length of DSP event [34]. The following are the 
basic strategies for load response during a DSP event: 
Foregoing: It involves curtailing load when prices are high compared to some threshold 
value and service is less than critical point. 
Substitution: It means to substitute electrical energy consumption to an alternative 
resource. 
Shifting: It means the ability to change the amount of energy consumed at any given 
time. „Load shifting‟ can be done by turning off a piece of equipment; switching to 
internal, off-grid power generation sources; or operation of equipment only during off-
peak hours. 
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2.7 Implications of Demand Side Participation 
This section discusses implications of DSP in the electricity markets. In general, it has 
many implications on the market participants and the system as a whole. The retailers and 
large consumers of electricity make profits from the low wholesale electricity prices 
during critical periods due to the response of consumers to time-varying loads. A part of 
this profit must be assigned for the consumers who respond during critical periods of 
demand [35]. The implementation of DSP needs initial cost for the development of 
infrastructure and technology along with transition costs. DSP should be implemented 
only when the benefit derived from DSP is greater than the cost of implementation [36]. 
Moreover, the reduction in the electricity price due to DSP results in reduced scarcity 
rents (revenue obtained minus variable operating cost) to the generators. This scarcity 
rents now relocates to the demand-side. This reduction of rents may lead for generators to 
bid high for off-peak loads so that it can make up for the loss during peak periods. DSP 
encourages consumers who do not mind being disconnected totally or partially during 
emergency periods to serve as a reserve. These consumers would be paid an exercise 
amount with an option fee for their load being disconnected. This type of operation 
would secure the system as a whole and provides the essential economic operation. All in 
all, the concept of DSP provides security during emergency periods and is cost effective 
because it affects only consumers who wish to participate. But DSP has few 
disadvantages like; high cost involved in installing remote switching device makes the 
implementation of DSP limited to large consumers and difficulty to expect the size of 
load that should be reduced during emergency periods [37, 38]. 
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2.8 Electrical Markets and Transmission Networks 
Having studied the electricity markets, electricity pricing and demand side participation, 
it is important to see how the transmission networks are related to the electricity markets. 
It is very much tenable to assume that electricity can be traded as if all the generators and 
loads are connected to a single bus bar. There is a sequence in which electricity is traded 
into the markets. Generators produce the electricity, transmission system transmits it to 
the distribution system and finally distributors distribute it to the consumers. During this 
sequence of operation there may occur power losses and transmission constraints in the 
network. These transmission constraints and losses by a great mean can introduce 
distortions into the market. Thus, the role of system operator in such situations becomes 
very important that it should maintain the energy balance and system security at regular 
intervals [39]. 
2.8.1 Decentralized Market and Transmission Networks 
In decentralized trading or bilateral trading, only sellers and buyers are involved in 
energy transactions. In case of transmission constraints, these parties sign an energy 
trading contract agreeing on a particular quantity to be delivered at a particular time on 
agreed price and any other conditions. System operator must be informed about such 
trading. System operator then maintains the system security and energy balance [40]. In 
order to avoid any interruptions in power transmission between these two parties, the 
advocates of decentralized market suggest that these parties can own the physical 
transmission rights. It is the right to use the transmission system for a particular 
transaction in order to avoid interruption in power through a given transmission link. 
These rights are owned by auction in the market. The parties must decide themselves 
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whether or not the price linked with this rights is justifiable depending on their location 
and situations. Once the party owns this right, they can use them or sell them to other 
parties. This situation might prevent market participants to hoard the transmission 
capacity for enhancing market power. In practice, enforcing this phenomenon is hard 
because the path taken by the power in a network is decided by “physical laws but not by 
the wishes of market participants” [41]. Secondly, the exercise of market power can be 
exacerbated by some participants. Finally, the unused transmission constraints may be 
released very lately that the other market participants find difficulty in readjusting their 
trading positions [42]. 
2.8.2 Centralized Market and Transmission Networks 
In centralized market, producers and consumers submit their supply offers and demand 
bids to the system operator. System operator, after collecting these offers and bids, 
optimally clears the market by taking into account the problem of system security 
imposed due to transmission constraints. These constraints may create congestion in the 
transmission network. To avoid this congestion consumer may be forced to purchase 
power from local generators which may be expensive. This congestion divides the market 
into separate zones resulting in different prices at different locations of a network [43, 
44]. These prices are called “locational marginal prices” since the marginal cost is based 
upon the location where energy is produced or consumed. If these prices are different at 
different buses of a system then these prices are called as nodal prices [45]. Hence, in 
centralized electricity market with transmission constraints the price of electrical energy 
depends on the location or bus where the power is produced or consumed. The role of 
ISO in centralized electricity market is very essential when compared to bilateral trading. 
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ISO needs to achieve the economic efficiency by optimally using the transmission 
constraints [46]. 
Due to differences in the prices at different buses, a surplus called „merchandizing 
surplus‟ may arise. This is always equal to the difference between the prices of producing 
bus and consuming bus multiplied by the flow on the interconnection between two buses. 
As this surplus is due to congestion in transmission network it is also known as 
“congestion surplus”. This surplus is collected by the market operator (MO). However, 
MO should not keep this surplus with it as this encourages congestion or at least no 
proper action to be taken towards reducing transmission constraints. If this surplus is 
returned to the market participants then the concept of nodal marginal prices would go 
blunt which was designed to encourage achieving economic efficiency [47]. The 
settlement of congestion surplus is discussed in section 2.10.2. 
2.9 Losses in Transmission Networks 
Electrical power transmission through an electrical network results in losses. The losses 
are to be supplied by one or more generators and hence these generators expect to be paid 
for their production [48]. Therefore, a mechanism must be designed to take into account 
the cost of losses in the electricity markets. P. O. Oluseyi, et al[49] presents the 
consequences of losses in Nigeria and the modeling of electricity market. 
The prices, that are to be paid to generators because of losses in the network, are shared 
by the loads at different buses. MO decides the price of losses depending upon the power 
flow. There is no particular rigorous method to quantify the cost of losses [50].  
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2.10 Managing Transmission Constraints in Centralized Electricity Markets 
It is unusual for the market participants to purchase all the power required through the 
spot market. In order to avoid fluctuations in electricity prices, which usually occur in the 
spot market, participants sign contract for differences agreeing on delivery of a certain 
quantity and at a certain price at a particular period. It is important to see how 
transmission constraints affect these contracts and what new contractual measures must 
be taken to manage the congestion risk. Losses also do affect the marginal nodal prices 
but this affect is small and is predictable [51]. So, this thesis considers only the effect of 
transmission congestion. 
2.10.1 New Contractual Tools 
In centralized electricity markets, the energy generated and consumed is traded through 
the „pool‟. System Operator receives price for energy consumed at the bus based on its 
nodal price and pays the price for energy produced at the bus depending upon its nodal 
pride. In order to avoid vagaries of the nodal prices, market participants are allowed to 
sign „bilateral contracts‟. When there is no congestion in the network, the nodal prices 
almost remain the same depending upon the location. When congestion occurs in the 
network, different buses have different nodal prices. The contract signed between two 
parties depending upon their nodal prices may result in incompatible expectations. In 
general, this contract which covers only the delivery of energy does not work during 
congestion. In this situation, market participants should not only contract for the energy 
trading but also for “the ability of transmission system to deliver it” [52, 53].  
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2.10.2 Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) 
In order to avoid the incompatible expectations resulting in the contract for difference, 
the parties signing the contract should also hold financial transmission rights (FTRs). 
FTRs are between two nodes which own the holders of its revenue equal to the product of 
price difference between two nodes and the capacity of flow through that branch. This is 
same as the “congestion surplus” that was discussed in section 2.8.2. The amount derived 
from these rights will be used to settle the contract between two parties. These rights 
completely isolate the risk associated with congestion in the system. In order to own 
these rights, participants need to undergo an auction process where in all generators, 
consumers and speculators can participate in order to gain profit from the locational price 
differences [54]. The highest bidder of this auction will be given FTRs. The bidder at 
maximum can submit the difference between the nodal prices as its bid. These FTRs are 
usually defined from one point of network to any other of the network irrespective of its 
direct connection through a branch. The matter of concern is only „the bus where the 
power is injected‟ and „the bus where power should be extracted‟; the path of power flow 
is of no importance. These rights are known as point-to-point FTRs [55]. 
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2.10.3 Flow-Gate Rights  
In point-to-point FTRs, the rights are defined from point-to-point. Instead of this, rights 
can be linked to a branch or flow-gate in the network. These rights are known as Flow-
Gate Rights (FGRs). The price of these rights is fixed to a value of „langrage multiplier‟ 
or „shadow cost‟ associated with maximum available capacity of flow-gate [56]. If the 
branch is not operating at its maximum available capacity then its langrage multiplier is 
zero. The participants in contract should only own FGRs of congested branches.  Only 
those FGRs can produce revenue which is operating at its highest capacity. The risk 
associated with FGRs is that the congested branches are difficult to be predicted. The 
owner of FGRs never pay money back to the MO since Langrage multiplier is never 
negative [57]. 
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2.11 Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets 
In double-sided auction competitive electricity markets, market participants face the 
problem of bidding because it‟s their bidding strategy which defines them as either a 
market winner or loser. Whereas, in bilateral trading there is no such strategy but it 
requires the necessity of price negotiation between the parties. Therefore, market 
participants construct their bidding strategy in order to avoid risks and maximize their 
social welfare by trading through pool markets. Hence, Strategic bidding can be defined 
as the process by which the market participants aim to achieve their performance goals by 
developing bids. System operator encourages such competitive bidding processes to 
achieve the cost-minimizing function. While each market participant develops bidding 
strategy using rivals historical data to maximize the profit [58]. Market price and 
electricity trade depend on bidding strategies of market participants. The various factors 
that should be considered when providing the power quantity and price bids are  
a. Load patterns (daily, weekly and seasonal). 
b. Generation technical limits. 
c. Demand prediction. 
d. Previous market clearing prices. 
e. Maintenance of generators and lines etc. 
The winners of market will be paid or pay on the basis of rules agreed in the electricity 
market. It either follows uniform or PAB pricing, discussed in chapter 2, section 2.4.  
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Market participants analyze and construct their bidding strategy using several approaches 
or techniques. The following are the few techniques used by the participants. 
a. Optimization-based technique: In this technique, the rivals in the electricity 
market are modeled stochastically or deterministically using probability 
distribution functions. This approach uses the historical data of rivals participating 
in the market. Then different bidding strategies using various factors such as risk 
factors, retail price, interruptible price and correlation coefficient are studied. 
Finally, optimal bidding strategy is determined from the various designed 
scenarios [59]. 
b. Equilibrium-based approach: In this category, rivals are considered in determining 
game theoretic equilibrium of market[60].  
c. Learning-based approach: In this category, learning algorithms are applied to 
bidding strategy problem. Due to electrical market complexities, it is more 
effective since it learns from the empirical data [61]. 
Technique (a) is used in this thesis wherein Monte-Carlo Simulation and GA tools are 
applied to build an optimal bidding strategy for an LSE. 
2.11.1 Bidding Strategies for Electricity Producers 
Electricity producers can build their optimal bidding strategies in three ways.  
The first way is to believe that its energy offering will not influence market price and thus 
it acts as a price taker. In this case, producer will determine its bidding strategy based on 
the estimation of MCP. Once, it estimates the MCP it will offer the energy at a price little 
cheaper than MCP. Analysis of forecasted load, transmission constraints and behavior of 
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participants will help the producer to estimate the MCP. But, this method will not hold 
for a longer time since the historical data available is very little in the market and also the 
assumption that its behavior will not affect or influence the market is implicit.   
The second way is to believe that supplier‟s strategy of energy offering will influence the 
market but assumes that rivals bids or offers as known from historical data available. This 
method models the rivals stochastically or deterministically into a bi-level optimization 
problem. For the first level, supplier tries to maximize its profit under the constraints and 
for the second level ISO finds an OPF to minimize the system cost. Monte-Carlo 
Simulation and GA tools are applied to find the optimal bidding behavior of the supplier. 
Finally, the third way is to believe that its energy supplying strategy will influence the 
market and considers the bidding strategy of rivals who also tries to maximize their 
profit. In this method, supplier should have the information of rivals generation cost and 
consumers load behaviors. This approach is hard and requires gaming to construct the 
optimal bidding strategy. But, once constructed this method is the most reliable [62, 63]. 
2.11.2 Bidding Strategies for Electricity Consumers 
As mentioned before, Independent Load Serving Entity (LSE) will compete with other 
LSEs and suppliers in double-sided auction electricity market. LSEs submit the offers for 
purchasing electricity through pool trading to ISO.  Like suppliers, the profits of LSEs 
also depend on their bidding strategies to a certain extent. These strategic biddings of 
LSEs might show some significant impacts on electricity markets. Demand Side Bidding 
(DSB) is a strategy that enables the demand to actively participate in the trading of 
electricity [62, 63].  
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Several researchers have developed bidding strategies for LSEs using a day-ahead 
market. Stochastic processes and Nash-cournot techniques are used to model market 
participants. This thesis uses ‘step wise bidding functions and pay-as-bid settlement 
protocols‟ to develop an optimal bidding strategy for LSEs. Last Accepted Bid (LAB) 
pricing rule is used to determine MCP. Bidding behaviors of the market participants 
(rivals) are described by a normal probability distribution function, and a stochastic 
optimization model is used to formulate the issue of constructing optimal strategic 
bidding for LSEs. Monte-Carlo approach is applied to get the corresponding solutions. 
Finally Genetic Algorithm (GA) is applied to get the optimal solution out of Monte-Carlo 
Simulation solutions[64]. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
MATHEMATICAL MODELING FOR LOAD SERVING ENTITIES 
 
This chapter develops a mathematical model for an LSE in pool-based double-sided 
competitive electricity market. The market uses „step-wise price/quantity bidding 
functions and PAB settlement‟ with LAB pricing rules. The trading for electric power is 
done daily dividing each day into 24 trading periods. Bidding for next 24 periods is done 
before the next day starts [64]. 
3.1 Mathematical Modeling of an LSE in Electricity Market 
Considering two models of electricity market pools without and with transmission 
constraints, a bidding strategy for the LSE is developed. These models consist of Y 
„independent Gencos‟ and Z „independent LSEs‟. One out of the available LSEs, suppose 
X, is considered to build the optimal bidding strategy. Hence the rivals of this LSE are 
Y+Z-1. “Each generation company bid at most Ig blocks for each period; the block price 
must be non-decreasing with the increase of the block number. Each LSE bid at most Id 
blocks for each period, the block price must decrease with the increase of the block 
number. The market operator (MO) receives selling energy bids from Gencos and buying 
energy bids from LSEs and then determines the generation dispatching level of every 
Genco and the demand dispatching level of every LSE for every trading period and also 
the market clearing price (MCP)” [64, 65].  
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Suppose the forecasted load for each type of load is        
Where, X represents the LSE X and                         
The process of bidding for the selected time period will be as follows: 
   
      Block quantity for each type of load 
 ̅  
     Cleared block quantity for each type of load 
    
      Cleared block price for each type of load After Market Clearing Process 
Retail price: It is the price at which LSEs would sell the power to the end customers. Its 
unit is $. The thesis uses retail price as „a’ $ per MW. 
Interruptible price: It is the price that LSEs would pay to the end customers in case of any 
interruption in power supply. Its unit is $. The thesis uses interruptible price as „b’ $ per 
MW. 
The block prices and quantities can be represented as: 
    = (    
 ,     
 ,     
 ….…    
  )         (3.1) 
 ̅   = ( ̅  
 , ̅  
 , ̅  
  ……. ̅  
   )       (3.2) 
The objective of this model is to find the maximum profit for LSE with optimal bidding 
strategy. Hence the profit of LSE X can be described as 
     ̅  )      ( ̅    
       ̅  )      (3.3) 
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Where, 
   is the profit of LSE X in one unit time 
   ̅  ) is the retail income  
   ̅  ) is the maintenance cost of distribution system 
 ̅   is the dispatched demand power 
The retail income of the LSE X is equal to the revenue from sold power to end customers 
minus the expense of interrupted power to end customers, illustrated as  
   ̅  ) =    ̅    
          ̅   )      (3.4) 
Using (3.4) in (3.3) we get 
      ̅    
    (     ̅  )
 
     ( ̅    
       ̅  )   (3.5) 
The problem for building an optimal bidding strategy for LSE X is to maximize its profit. 
So to find optimal solution, the risks involved in the market should also be taken into 
account. According to investment theory, the variances of the potential profit can be used 
to evaluate the risks of an investment. Hence the problem is formulated as the following 
stochastic optimization problem [64-66]. 
                        (3.6) 
Subject to: 
        ̅    
    (     ̅  )
 
     ( ̅    
       ̅  )   (3.7) 
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∑  ̅  
   
     ̅           (3.8) 
                 (3.9) 
                 (3.10)   
                (3.11) 
                
              (3.12) 
                           
Where,  
     is the expected value of profit   
     is the standard deviation 
   and   are used to represent the degree of risk 
      and        
The above optimization problem cannot be solved directly as the LSE X does not know 
the bidding parameters of rivals before the sealed auction. The bidding parameters of 
rivals can be estimated using the historical bidding data and load forecast. The bidding 
behavior represents a stochastic process can be represented as Bivariate Normal 
Distribution (BND) where each rival form both Gencos and LSEs has to submit block 
bidding with two values containing quantity and price [64-66]. Bidding behavior of 
Gencos has  ̃   
        ̃  
     ̃  
    and   ̃   
        ̃  
     ̃  
    which follows the 
bivariate normal distribution defined by the probability density function as 
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(3.13) can be summarized in matrix form as 
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Where,                             
On the other hand, bidding behavioral form of LSEs has  ̃   
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   which follows the bivariate normal distribution and defined by the 
probability density function as 
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(3.15) can be represented in matrix form as  
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+      (3.16)                        
      
Where,                                 
 „ρ‟ is the correlation coefficient. 
µ and    represents the mean and variance of the quantity and price for for both Gencos 
and LSEs. 
The correlation coefficient between         with expected values           and 
standard deviations            is their covariance normalized by their standard 
deviation, as follows 
    
       
    
         (3.17) 
3.2 Monte Carlo Simulation Method 
Monte Carlo methods solve a variety of mathematical problems by using continuously 
generated random numbers and probability theory. The solution obtained by this method 
is only the approximate solution to the problem. Thus, Monte-Carlo Simulation can be 
defined as “statistical simulation methods where statistical simulation is defined in quite 
general terms to be any method that utilizes sequences of random numbers to perform the 
simulation”. The basic idea of Monte-Carlo Simulation is that if series of samples are not 
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exactly distributed according to the density function then it is likely that the deviation 
will be small at least for large number of samples. Therefore, mean of arbitrary number 
of samples should be approximately equal to the expectation value [67, 68] . Monte-Carlo 
Simulation can be applied in electricity markets to get the expected behavior of the 
electricity market by investigating how the electricity market will work in a number of 
less or more randomly chosen scenarios. The advantage of this method is that it is quite 
straight forward to include market strategies and market designs. The only disadvantage 
is that it requires a lot of computation[68]. 
In an experiment of double-sided competitive electricity market, expectation value of 
profit for LSE X when it adopts bidding strategy is given by, 
     (
 
 
)∑                  (3.18)  
Where,  
   is the     random sampling value. 
T is the „total random sampling number‟ 
      is the profit of LSE X of the     random sampling value 
The scatter degree of samples       can be described by standard deviation as 
     √(
 
   
)∑              
 
         (3.19) 
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If the scatter degree is small, the fluctuation level of the expectation profit is small which 
means bidding strategy has small risks and if the scatter degree is large then the 
fluctuations in the expectation profit will be large resulting in serious or large risks. 
A coefficient called mutation coefficient is used to measure the level of risk relatively 
with the expected value of profit. Mathematically it can be stated as,  
Mutation Coefficient     (
    
    
)              (3.20) 
3.3 Optimization by Genetic Algorithm 
Genetic Algorithm (GA) is a technique for a problem which continuously modifies the 
population of individual solutions. GA, step by step, produces children for the next 
generation using individuals randomly from the current population commonly known as 
parents. This process of evolution will continue towards an optimal level giving an 
optimal solution to a problem. Thus, it can be defined in a general way as “a method to 
solve both constrained and unconstrained optimization problems that is based on natural 
selection, the process that drives biological evolution”. Problems in which objective 
functions are stochastic, non-differentiating, non-linear can be solved by GA [69]. Two 
types of GA are mainly used to find the optimal solution for problems, they are binary 
code GA and real coded GA. Binary coded GA is used to code chromosomes and is 
known to be a popular method. Whereas, real coded GA is more effective in the real 
world when compared to binary coded GA because binary coded GA has problems like 
encoding and decoding [70].  
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The steps in which GA works are  
1. Contribution to next generation by selecting individuals from the current 
population called parents. 
2. Generation of children by combining two parents. 
3. Applying random changes to individual parents to form children. 
 Once the bidding strategies for LSE X are developed, the GA optimization is applied in 
order to get step by step optimized bidding strategy for LSE X[71]. 
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3.4 Procedure for Optimal Bidding Strategy 
The procedure of building optimal bidding strategy for an LSE X in an electricity market 
is listed as follows: 
1. Specify the parameters of rivals‟ probability distribution functions (pdfs) as in 
equations (3.14) and (3.16). 
2. Execute Monte-Carlo simulation as follows: 
a. Specify the random sampling number „T’. 
b. Specify the offering parameters of Gencos   ̃   
  ,  ̃   
   and bidding 
parameters of LSEs   ̃   
 
 ,  ̃   
    as in equations (3.14) and (3.16). 
c. Determine the market clearing quantity and market clearing price from market 
clearing process. 
d. Calculate      . 
e. Calculate the expectation profit      and standard deviation      using 
equation (3.18) and (3.19). 
f. Calculate the net profit   using equation (3.6). 
3. Create a genetic algorithm whose population members represent the risk factor α, 
bidding price p, standard deviation     , retail price a and interruptible price b. 
4. Initialize GA population and maximum number of generation, Tgen. 
5. Set GA generation counter tgen = 0. 
6. Regard   as the fitness function of the population members. 
7. Perform the standard GA operators, i.e. parent selection, crossover, mutation, etc. 
8. Set tgen = tgen +1 
9. If tgen < Tgen. go back to 5; otherwise go to 10. 
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10. Find the fittest member of the genetic algorithm as the optimal bidding strategy. 
11. Stop 
The first two steps represent the Monte-Carlo Simulation for the model, while the steps 
from 3 to 10 represent GA optimization.  
Figure 3.1 shows a flowchart for the procedure of optimal bidding strategy of an LSE in 
electricity market. 
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Figure ‎3.1 Flow chart for Optimal Bidding Strategy 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the simulation and analysis 
on building an optimal bidding strategy for an LSE in an electricity market without 
transmission constraints. This market consists of 3 Gencos and 4 LSEs. The second part 
presents the simulation and analysis on optimal bidding strategy for an LSE using IEEE-
30 bus system market model with transmission constraints.  
4.1 Optimal Bidding Strategy without Transmission Constraints 
Consider a model without transmission constraints, with Y=3 Gencos and Z= 4 LSEs as 
shown in figure 4.1. LSE X out of 4 LSEs is selected to build optimal bidding strategy 
which means the number of rivals for LSE X is Y+Z-1 = 6. 
 
Figure ‎4.1 Single line diagram of a market model with 3 Gencos and 4 LSEs 
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The distribution system maintenance cost function of LSE X is taken as [64-66] 
   ̅             ̅          ̅  
        (4.1)          
   ̅    represents the cost that an LSE X has incurred while maintaining technical and 
administrative actions, including supervision actions, intended to restore the system to a 
state in which it can perform a required function.  
Each market participant is allowed to bid at most 3 blocks (Ig=3 and Id=3) 
For each type of load for LSE X, let the forecasted load be 200MW 
Therefore, total demand for LSE X = 600MW 
Also let,                      [64-66] 
The minimum bidding block price of LSEs determined by MO is          
Table 4.1 shows the estimated parameters for 3 Gencos [64-66]. µ(qty) in Table 4.1 
represents the mean value of bidding quantity with a standard deviation of σ(qty). 
Similarly, µ(prc) represents the mean value of bidding price with a standard deviation of  
σ(prc). Table 4.1 also shows that the bidding prices for Gencos are increasing from one 
block to the another block, i.e. it is $15 for Genco 1 during block 1 then $35 during block 
2 and finally $50 during block 3. The other Gencos also follow the same increasing block 
prices for their supplied capacity. 
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Table ‎4.1 offering parameters for 3 Gencos 
Genco 
Block1 Block2 Block3 Variance 
µ(qty) 
(MW) 
µ(prc) 
($) 
µ(qty) 
(MW) 
µ(prc) 
($) 
µ(qty) 
(MW) 
µ(prc) 
($) 
σ‎(qty) 
(MW) 
σ(prc) 
($) 
1 300 15 200 35 400 50 5.5 2.5 
2 200 25 300 45 400 60 5.5 2.5 
3 200 55 400 73 300 95 5.5 2.5 
 
Table 4.2 shows the estimated parameters for 3 LSEs [64-66]. µ(qty) in Table 4.2 
represents the mean value of bidding quantity with a standard deviation of σ(qty). 
Similarly, µ(prc) represents the mean value of bidding price with a standard deviation of  
σ(prc). Table 4.2 also shows that the bidding prices for LSEs are decreasing from one 
block to the another block, i.e. it is $63 for LSE 1 during block 1 then $43 during block 2 
and finally $23 during block 3. The other LSEs also follow the same decreasing block 
prices for their supplied capacity. 
Table ‎4.2 Bidding parameters for 3 LSEs 
LSE 
Block1 Block2 Block3 Variance 
µ(qty) 
(MW) 
µ(prc) 
($) 
µ(qty) 
(MW) 
µ(prc) 
($) 
µ(qty) 
(MW) 
µ(prc) 
($) 
σ‎(qty) 
(MW) 
σ(prc) 
($) 
1 100 63 300 43 200 23 5.5 2.5 
2 190 85 230 65 180 48 5.5 2.5 
3 150 93 220 73 230 43 5.5 2.5 
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4.1.1 Pool-based Power Market for Different Participants 
Pool-based power market is built for one unit time to determine market clearing price and 
market clearing quantity for all participants. First, rearrange the offers of Gencos in 
ascending order by the block price and then rearrange the bids of LSEs in descending 
order by block price. After that, dispatch the selling energy bids and buying energy bids 
until the buying price is just less than or equal to selling price. Last Accepted Bid method 
is employed to get the market clearing price and market clearing quantity. The pool-based 
market built for above model is shown in figure 4.2. 
 
Figure ‎4.2 Market Clearing Process 
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Market clearing price and quantity obtained from pool-based power market gives the idea 
of how to bid in the market to clear required quantity. LSE X should bid above market 
clearing price i.e., $48.056 to be a market winner. Bidding of LSE X decides how much 
quantity it can clear from the market. Different bidding strategies for selected LSE X are 
studied using Monte-Carlo Simulation which calculates expectation profit and standard 
deviation for each bidding strategy of the LSE.  The effect of various factors like 
correlation coefficient, risk factor, retail price and interruptible prices on bidding strategy 
of the LSE will be studied step by step. The building of optimal strategy for the LSE X in 
this thesis is divided into two types of blocks per unit time. 
1. Single bidding block per unit time 
2. Three bidding blocks per unit time  
At first, optimal bidding strategy is constructed using single bidding block per unit time 
then it is constructed for three bidding blocks per unit time. Finally, the strategies are 
compared and the observations are documented. 
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Single Block Bidding per Unit time 
The LSE X will bid only single price for all the blocks to clear 600 MW. 
4.1.2 Selection of Correlation Coefficient for Bidding Strategy 
The correlation coefficient represents the relation between two random variables (here, 
quantity and price of Gencos/LSEs) with expected and standard deviation values of price 
and quantity. For an example, as shown in Table 4.3, the first value of correlation 
coefficient represents correlation coefficient of Gencos and the second value of 
correlation coefficient represents the correlation coefficient of LSEs. Negative sign in the 
table shows that the price and quantity are negatively related i.e. price increases as 
quantity is required.  
Initially, the retail price is set to $100 and the interruptible price is set to $75. Maximum 
number of random samplings is set as      . The bidding strategies of rivals are 
described according to equations 3.14 and 3.16 [64-66]. Different combinations of 
correlation coefficients are used with same values but different signs. Table 4.3 shows the 
impact of various correlation coefficients on bidding strategies of LSE X. KED represents 
the relative risk level as represented in equation 3.20. 
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Table ‎4.3 Impact of Correlation coefficient on bidding strategies 
Correlation 
coefficient 
(ρ) 
MCP ($) 
Expected 
profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation($) 
Net Profit 
($) 
KED % 
0 and 0 62.939 14322 2184 12671 15.249 
-0.1 and 0.1 63.056 14306 2170.5 12658 15.171 
-0.1 and 0.5 62.949 14316 2176.6 12667 15.204 
-0.9 and 0.9 63.013 14304 2185.5 12655 15.28 
0.9 and -0.9 63.054 14315 2187.2 12665 15.279 
0.5 and -0.1 63.06 14253 2175.1 12610 15.261 
0.1 and -0.1 63.012 14324 2174.3 12673 15.249 
0.1 and 0.1 63.096 14327 2182.6 12676 15.234 
0.5 and 0.5 62.934 14309 2190.7 12659 15.31 
0.9 and 0.9 63.01 14321 2186.6 12671 15.268 
 
The results of various combinations of generator and LSE correlation coefficients show 
that the impact of correlation coefficient was on the market clearing level and standard 
deviation. Out of all the combinations above, this thesis uses -0.1 and 0.1 as the 
correlation coefficient for generators and LSEs. This combination gives low standard 
deviation when compared to other combinations.   
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4.1.3 Impact of Different Bidding Strategies on Expectation Profit and Standard      
Deviation 
Correlation coefficients of generator and LSEs are set to -0.1 and 0.1 respectively. At 
first, the impacts of different bidding strategies on expected profit and standard deviation 
of LSE X when it does not include itself into the pool market is studied. LSE X assumes 
that it clears all the required quantity from the market. This strategy is just to get the clear 
idea how risks and profits of LSE varies with bidding prices and how should it bid when 
it includes itself within in the market. The results obtained are shown in the Table4.4. 
Table ‎4.4 Profits under different bidding Strategies 
MCP ($) 
MCQ 
(MW) 
Bidding 
Price ($) 
Quantity 
cleared 
(MW) 
Expected 
profit      
($) 
Standard 
Deviation     
($) 
48.056 1070 50 600 25120 2545.2 
48.056 1070 52 600 23920 2504.7 
48.056 1070 54 600 22718 2464.1 
48.056 1070 56 600 21522 2423.7 
48.056 1070 58 600 20324 2383.2 
 
Table 4.4 shows that, as the bidding price increases the expected profit decreases and the 
deviation also decreases. This means, if the LSE can bid high, the risk level of decision 
decreases but it also decreases its expected profit. Thus, LSE should make a compromise 
between expected profit and standard deviation which decides level of risk.  
 50   
 
4.1.4 The Impact of Different Participation of LSE X into the Pool-Market 
When LSE X involves itself into the pool market by providing bidding blocks, the market 
now consists of 4 LSEs and 3 Gencos. The total amount of load to be cleared is 600MW. 
The impacts of different bidding strategies on expected profit and standard deviation of 
the LSE X, when participating into the market are shown in Table4.5. 
Table ‎4.5 Different bidding strategies for LSE X 
MCP ($) 
MCQ 
(MW) 
Bidding 
Price ($) 
Quantity 
cleared 
(MW) 
Expected 
profit      
($) 
Standard 
Deviation     
($) 
49.890 1090 50 200 -20872 2575.5 
55.997 1290 56 400 188.26 2442.9 
63.055 1490 64 600 16663 2294.9 
63.007 1490 68 600 14321 2188.4 
 
Table 4.5 shows that when LSE X offer a price of $50 in the pool market it can clear only 
200 MW and its expected profit turns out to be negative. The reason for this is that LSE 
X has to pay the end customers interruptible prices for the un-cleared quantity of 400MW 
which results in loss. Also table 4.5 shows that as the bidding price increases the quantity 
cleared increases to require load, thus, the expected value of profit also increases. The 
deviation decreases with increasing bidding prices resulting in low risks. Once there is no 
interruptible load, with increase in bidding price the estimated profit decreases since the 
gap between the retail price to the end customers and bidding price decreases. 
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4.1.5 Impact of Different Weighting Factor on Bidding Strategies 
LSEs face many risks while adopting bidding strategies because if the bidding price is too 
low then there is a risk of not clearing the quantity required which reduces the profit of 
selling electric power to end customers. If the bidding price is too high, then there is a 
risk of paying unnecessary prices for purchasing electricity. Thus, weighting factor, as a 
measure of degree of risks is taken into account for building optimal bidding strategies 
for LSE. Weighting factor (also known as risk factor) is increased from 0.3 to 0.9 and 
Monte-Carlo Simulation is used to calculate the values of expectation profit and standard 
deviation results in Table4.6. 
Table ‎4.6 Different Bidding scenarios with respect to weighting factors 
α 
Quantity 
cleared 
(MW) 
Bidding 
Price ($) 
Expected 
profit 
     ($) 
Standard 
Deviation     
($) 
Net 
Profit ($) 
KED % 
0.3 200 50 -20846 2518.6 -8016.9 -12.082 
0.5 400 56 157.62 2422.1 -1123.9 
Not 
feasible 
0.7 600 64 16700 2277.3 11109.2 13.636 
0.9 600 68 14305 2197.1 12655 15.359 
 
Negative values of expected profit and net profit in table 4.6 shows that bidding lower 
price at lower factor of risk will make LSE X undergo loss since the cleared quantity is 
only 200MW and risk factor is very low. Under this situation, LSE X has to pay the end 
customers the interruptible prices for un-cleared quantities i.e. 400 MW. Table 4.6 also 
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shows that, when LSE increases its factor of risk, with increasing bidding prices, the 
profit increases. Thus, LSEs when bidding should always bid high with high factor of risk 
in order to maximize their net profit. KED represents the relative risk level. It becomes 
infeasible i.e. very high when the expected value of profit is very low. 
4.1.6 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Weighting Factor 
The GA optimization is applied to get the optimal bidding strategy among the results 
obtained from Monte-Carlo results of all bidding strategies. The parameters associated 
with GA are specified as Population is 100, mutation probability is 0.1, crossover 
probability is 0.8 and maximum permitted number of iterations is 100 [64-66]. GA 
optimization for weighting factor or risk factor (α) ranging from 0 to 1 is shown in 
Table4.7. 
Table ‎4.7  Optimal bidding strategy with weighting factor 
α 0.92914 
Bidding Price ($) 63.545 
Cleared Quantity (MW) 600 
Expected Profit ($) 16118 
Standard Deviation ($) 2405.2 
Net Profit ($) 14816 
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Figure4.3 shows the performance of GA while the optimization problem is processed. 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4.3 Performance of GA 
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4.1.7 Impact of Retail Price on Profit Maximization 
Retail price is the price at which LSEs would sell the power to the end customers. Thus, 
it is a very important factor for a LSE to maximize its profit. LSE X should choose retail 
price such that it should neither be too high resulting end customers to look out for other 
LSEs making LSE X out of business nor the retail price should be too low such that it 
causes LSE X to incur a loss. Using the results obtained from optimal bidding strategy for 
weighting factor, i.e. Table4.7; risk factor/weighting factor is set to 0.92914 and 
interruptible price is set to $75. The values of retail prices are increased from $80 to $140 
with increasing bidding prices. Results obtained from Monte-Carlo Simulation are shown 
in Table 4.8.  
Table ‎4.8 Effect of retail prices on strategic bidding 
Retail 
Price 
($) 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
Bidding 
Price ($) 
Expected 
profit      
($) 
Standard 
Deviation
     ($) 
Net 
profit ($) 
KED % 
80 200 52 -25286        2123.5        -23644      Infeasible 
100 400 56 183.79        2442.3       -2.2978        Infeasible 
120 600 60       31134        2769.9               28732 8.8965 
140 600 64 40738                     3117 37630    7.6514 
 
The reason for negative profit in Table4.8 is due to the dispatch of only 200MW by LSE. 
LSE should pay end customers interruptible prices for the unsupplied 400MW. Also 
Table4.8 shows as retail price increases the profit of the LSE X increases and also 
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increases the deviation. The increase in profit is due increased gap between bidding price 
and retail price. The high retail prices will encourage LSE to bid high in the market to 
dispatch more power from the market to gain high profits. The increase of retail price 
may also cause the consumers to choose the other LSEs which offers low retail price. 
4.1.8 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Retail Prices 
In order to decide whether the increased retail price which gives LSE a large profit is 
optimal or not, GA optimization is performed with retail price ranging from $80 to$140 
with same GA parameters as in section 4.1.6. The results obtained for different 
parameters are shown in Table4.9. 
Table ‎4.9 GA with retail prices as variable member 
α 0.97366 
Retail price ($) 128.18 
Bidding Price ($) 63.689 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 600 
Expected Profit ($) 33644 
Standard deviation ($) 2366.9 
Net profit ($) 32683 
 
The results obtained from GA optimization shows $128.18 would be the optimum retail 
price with 0.97366 weighting factor and $63.689 as bidding price. The values of expected 
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profit and net profit also seen in the Table 4.9 which are increased when compared to 
those values in Table4.7 due to increase in retail price. 
4.1.9 Impact of Interruptible Price on Profit Maximization 
The interruptible prices are the prices which LSE should pay to the end customers in case 
of interruption in power supply to the customers. Generally, LSEs signs interruptible 
contracts with end customers which allow LSEs to be secured in case of failing to supply 
its entire customer load. All they need to do is to pay the agreed financial compensation 
to the customers. 
Values of risk factor and retail price are set to the values obtained in Table4.9. By 
increasing the values of Interruptible price and bidding prices run the Monte- Carlo 
Simulation.  
Table ‎4.10 Strategic bidding with various interruptible prices 
Interruptible 
price ($) 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
Bidding 
Price 
($) 
Expected 
profit      
($) 
Standard 
Deviation
     ($) 
Net profit 
($) 
KED % 
55 200 52 -7633.5        2718.7       -7504.1       -35.61 
65 400 56 13463        2827.6               13034 21.003 
75 600 60 36040        2929.3                35013 8.1281 
85 600 64 33644        3048.5                32678 9.0608 
95 600 68      31246        3202.3              30338   10.249 
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From table 4.10 initially, the profit is negative because only 200MW were cleared and the 
LSE has to pay end customers interruptible prices for the un-cleared 400MW, which is a 
loss for LSE. The results from Table4.10 also shows that as interruptible prices to end 
consumers increases the deviation increases and the net profit of a LSE increases to a 
point where in there is no interruptible load. Once, there is no interruptible load, the 
effect of interruptible prices goes off and profit decreases due to high bidding prices 
which reduces the gap between retail price and bidding price. Thus, LSE will tend to bid 
high in the market to dispatch more power in order to avoid high interruptible prices to be 
paid to end customers in case of failing to provide power to end customers. 
4.1.10 Optimal Bidding Strategy by GA with Retail and Interruptible Price 
GA optimization is applied with interruptible price ranging from $55 to $95 using same 
GA parameters as in section 4.1.6. Table4.11 shows the optimal GA values obtained. 
Table  4.11 GA Optimization with Interruptible Price as a variable member 
α 0.90831        
Retail price ($) 139   
Interruptible price ($) 66.52 
Bidding Price ($) 60.859        
Quantity Cleared (MW) 600 
Expected Profit ($) 41486 
Standard deviation ($) 2279.7 
Net profit ($) 37415 
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Table 4.11 shows the GA optimization with weighting factor, retail price and 
interruptible price taken into account. The optimum interruptible price obtained is 
$60.859. The values of expectation profit and net profit are increased when compared to 
Table 4.9. 
4.1.11 Comparison Analysis 
Table 4.12 shows a comparison of three scenarios of bidding strategies as discussed in 
tables 4.7, 4.9 and 4.11. In Scenario1, the retail and interruptible prices are fixed to 100 
and 75 respectively. The net profit using Monte-Carlo Simulation method was found to 
be $14816. In scenario2, the retail price was changed to $128.18 by the optimization 
process where as the interruptible price was still fixed to $75 and the net profit increased 
$ 32683. Finally, in scenario3 retail price and interruptible price were changed to $139 
and $66.52 respectively by optimization process. The profit in scenario3 increased to 
$37415. 
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Table ‎4.12  Optimal Bidding Comparison 
Factors Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Retail price ($) 100 128.18 139 
Interruptible price($) 75 75 66.52 
α 0.92914 0.97366 0.90831 
Bidding price ($) 63.545 63.689 60.859 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 600 600 600 
Expected profit ($) 16118 33644 41486 
Standard deviation ($) 2405.2 2366.9 2279.7 
Net profit ($) 14816 32683 37415 
 
As the scenario3 involves high profit and low deviation with low risk value it should be 
preferred for optimal bidding strategy for single block bidding per unit time. 
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4.1.12 Comparison with Previous Work 
Table 4.13 shows the comparison between different scenarios found in literature survey 
[71] (highlighted) and the scenarios obtained in table 4.12. Last Accepted Offer (LAO) 
pricing rule without correlation coefficient was applied while building the optimal 
bidding strategy for an LSE in literature survey. This thesis uses Last Accepted Bid 
(LAB) pricing with correlation coefficient to develop an optimal bidding strategy for an 
LSE. The table 4.13 shows that an LSE applying LAB pricing rule with correlation 
coefficient has low deviation from its expected profit and thus the net profit is more 
deterministic and high (as seen in scenario 3 of table 4.12).  
Table ‎4.13 Optimal Bidding Comparison in Previous work 
Factors Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Retail price 
($) 
100 100 138.33 128.18 139.54 139 
Interruptible 
price($) 
75 75 75 75 80.755 66.52 
α 0.85817 0.92914 087991 0.97366 0.81715 0.90831 
Bidding price 
($) 
56.477 63.545 58.321 63.689 56.633 60.859 
Quantity 
Cleared (MW) 
600 600 600 600 600 600 
Expected 
profit ($) 
20479 16118 41657.059 33644 42808.217 41486 
Standard 
deviation ($) 
2441 2405.2 2411.4 2366.9 2336 2279.7 
Net profit ($) 17228 14816 36944 32683 35408 37415 
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Three Block Bidding Per Unit Time 
The LSE will bid single price for each block in increasing order to clear 600MW. 
4.1.13 Profits with Different Bidding Strategies 
Initially, the retail price is set to $[100, 80, 55] and the interruptible price is set to $[75, 
35, 15]. Maximum number of random samples is set to      . Describe the bidding 
strategies of rivals according to equations 3.14 and 3.16 [64-66]. When LSE X involves 
itself into the pool market by providing bidding blocks, the market now consists of 4 
LSEs and 3 Gencos. The total amount of load to be cleared is 600MW. The impacts of 
different bidding strategies by LSE X on expected profit and standard deviation, when 
participating into the market are shown in Table4.14. 
Table  4.14 Different bidding strategies for LSE X 
Bidding Prices 
($) 
MCP ($) 
Quantity    
Cleared (MW) 
Expected Profit 
($) 
Standard 
Deviation ($) 
[52,50,48] 51.973 200 -1255.2 2873 
[56,52,50] 51.893 400 9515 2759.9 
[62,60,52] 59.888 400 7106.4 2624.8 
[62,60,54] 53.985 600 9685.3 2593.3 
 
Table 4.14 shows that when LSE X offer a price of $[52, 50, 48] in the pool market it can 
clear only 200 MW and its expected profit turns out to be negative. Table 4.14 also shows 
that as the bidding price increases the quantity cleared increases to require load and 
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interruptible load no more exists, thus, the expected value of profit also increases. The 
deviation decreases with increasing bidding prices resulting in low risks. Once there is no 
interruptible load, with increase in bidding price the estimated profit decreases since the 
gap between the retail price to the end customers and bidding price decreases. 
4.1.14 Impact of Different Weighting Factor on Bidding Strategies 
LSEs face many risks while adopting bidding strategies because if the bidding price is too 
low then there is a risk of not clearing the quantity required which reduces the profit of 
selling electric power to end customers. And if the bidding price is too high, then there is 
a risk of paying unnecessary prices for purchasing electricity. Thus, weighting factor, as a 
measure of degree of risks is taken into account for building optimal bidding strategies 
for LSE. Increasing risk factor from 0.3 to 0.9 and using Monte-Carlo Simulation for the 
calculation of expectation profit and standard deviation results in Table4.15. 
Table ‎4.15 Different Bidding scenarios with respect to weighting factors 
α 
Bidding 
Prices ($) 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net 
Profit 
($) 
KED % 
0.3 [52,50,48] 200 -1258.5        2893.3       -2402.8 Infeasible 
0.6 [56,52,50] 400 9513.8 2781.1 4825.7 28.056 
0.9 [62,60,54] 600 9684.9 2602.8 8455.3 26.875 
 
Negative values of expected profit and net profit in table 4.15 shows that when bidding 
lower price at lower factor of risk will make LSE X undergo loss since the cleared 
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quantity is only 200MW and risk factor is very low. Under this situation, LSE X has to 
pay the end customers the interruptible prices for un-cleared quantities i.e. 400 MW. 
Table 4.15 also shows that, when LSE increases its factor of risk, with increasing bidding 
prices, the profit increases. Thus, LSEs when bidding should always prefer to bid high 
with high factor of risk in order to maximize their net profit. KED represents the relative 
risk level. It becomes infeasible i.e. very high when the expected value of profit is very 
low. 
4.1.15 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Weighting Factor 
 The GA optimization is applied to get the optimal bidding strategy among the results 
obtained from Monte-Carlo results of all bidding strategies. The parameters associated 
with GA are specified as Population is 100, mutation probability is 0.1, crossover 
probability is 0.8 and maximum permitted number of iterations is 100 [64-66]. GA 
optimization for risk factor ranging from 0 to 1 is shown in Table4.16. 
Table ‎4.16  Optimal bidding strategy with weighting factor 
α 0.96699 
Bidding price ($) [ 61.789,59.577,57.223] 
Expected Profit ($) 7228.8 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 600 
Standard Deviation ($) 2365.8 
Net Profit ($) 6904.9 
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4.1.16 Impact of Retail Price on Profit Maximization 
Using the results obtained from optimal bidding strategy for weighting factor, i.e. 
Table4.16, risk factor is fixed to 0.96699 and interruptible price is fixed to $[75,35,15]. 
The values of retail prices are increased from $[100, 80, 55] to $[140, 100, 75] with 
increasing bidding prices. The results obtained from Monte-Carlo Simulation are 
documented in Table 4.17. 
Table ‎4.17 Strategic bidding with various interruptible prices 
Retail Price 
($) 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
Bidding 
Price ($) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net 
profit 
($) 
KED% 
[100,80,55] 200 [52,50,48] -1257.7        2919.6            -1312.5 -232.15 
[110,90,65] 400 [56,52,50] 13928        3113.3               13366 22.352 
[120,100,75] 400 [62,60,52] 15137        3267.5              14529   21.587 
[140,100,75] 600 [64,60,54] 18744                      3543 18008    18.902 
 
The reason for negative profit in Table4.17 is due to the dispatch of only 200MW by 
LSE. LSE should pay end customers interruptible prices for the unsupplied 400MW. Also 
Table4.17 shows as retail price increases the profit of the LSE X increases and also 
increases the deviation. The increase in profit is due increased gap between bidding price 
and retail price. The high retail prices will encourage LSE to bid high in the market to 
dispatch more power. But the increase of retail price may also cause the consumers to 
choose the other LSEs which offers low retail price. 
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4.1.17 The Optimal Bidding Strategy with Retail Prices 
In order to decide whether the increased retail price which gives LSE a large profit is 
optimal or not, GA optimization is performed with retail price ranging from $[100, 80, 
55] to$[140, 100, 75] with same GA parameters as in section 4.1.15. The results obtained 
for different parameters are shown in Table4.18. 
Table ‎4.18 GA with retail prices as variable member 
α 0.90128 
Retail price ($) [138.04,96.83,74.37] 
Bidding Price ($) [62.169,59.143,52.538] 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 600 
Expected Profit ($) 19657 
Standard deviation ($) 2147.2 
Net profit ($) 17362 
 
The results obtained from GA optimization shows $[138.04, 96.83, 74.37] would be the 
optimum retail price with 0.90128 weighting factor and $[62.169, 59.143, 52.538] as 
bidding price. The values of expected profit and net profit also seen in the Table 4.17 
which are increased when compared to those values in Table 4.16 due to increased retail 
price. 
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Figure4.4 shows the performance of GA while the optimization problem is processed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4.4 Performance of GA 
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4.1.18 Impact of Interruptible Price on Profit Maximization 
Generally, LSEs signs interruptible contracts with end customers which allow LSEs to be 
secured in case of failing to supply its entire customer load. All they need to do is pay the 
agreed financial compensation to the customers. 
The values of risk factor and retail price are set to the values obtained in Table4.18. 
Monte- Carlo Simulation is performed by increasing the values of Interruptible price with 
bidding prices.  
Table ‎4.19 Strategic bidding with various interruptible prices 
Interruptible 
price ($) 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
Bidding Price 
($) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net 
profit 
($) 
KED % 
[75,35,15] 200 [52,50,48] 6382.1        3807.3        5376.2        59.656       
[85,45,25] 400 [56,52,50] 18942                         3987 16678 21.049 
[95,55,35] 600 [62,60,54] 24598                         4172 21757 16.961 
 
From table 4.19 initially, the profit is low because only 200MW were cleared and the 
LSE has to pay end customers interruptible prices for the un-cleared 400MW. The results 
from Table4.19 also show that that as interruptible prices to end consumers increases the 
deviation increases and the net profit of a LSE increases to a point where in there is no 
interruptible load. Once, there is no interruptible load, the effect of interruptible prices 
goes off and profit decreases due to high bidding prices which reduces the gap between 
retail price and bidding price. Thus, LSE will tend to bid high in the market to dispatch 
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more power in order to avoid high interruptible prices to be paid to end customers in case 
of failing to provide power to end customers. 
4.1.19 Optimal Bidding Strategy by GA with Retail and Interruptible Price 
GA optimization is applied with interruptible price ranging from $[75, 35, 15] to $[95, 
55, 35]. The GA parameters are same as those used in section 4.1.15. 
Table4.20 shows the optimal GA values obtained. 
Table ‎4.20  GA optimization with Interruptible Price as a variable member 
α 0.90469 
Retail price ($) [139.6,93.344,72.183] 
Interruptible price ($) [83.955,41.16,24.861] 
Price ($) [62.015,59.996,52.034] 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 600 
Expected Profit ($) 24117 
Standard deviation ($) 2280.7 
Net profit ($) 21521 
 
Table 4.20 shows the GA optimization with weighting factor, retail price and 
interruptible price taken into account. The optimum interruptible price obtained is 
$[83.955, 41.16, and 24.86]. The values of expectation profit and net profit are increased 
when compared to Table 4.18. 
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4.1.20 Comparison Analysis 
Table 4.21 shows a comparison of three scenarios of bidding strategies from tables 4.16, 
4.18 and 4.20. In Scenario1, the retail and interruptible prices are fixed to [100, 80, 55] 
and [75, 35, 15] respectively. The net profit using Monte-Carlo Simulation method was 
found to be $6904.9. In scenario2, the retail price was changed to $[138.04, 96.83, 74.37] 
by the optimization process where as the interruptible price was still fixed to $[75, 35, 
15] and the net profit increased to $ 17362. Finally, in scenario3 retail price and 
interruptible price were changed to $[139.6, 93.344, 72.183] and $[83.955, 41.16, 
24.861] respectively by optimization process. The profit in scenario3 increased to 
$21521. 
Table ‎4.21  Optimal bidding comparison 
Factors Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Retail price(a) 
($) 
[100,80,55] [138.04,96.83,74.37] [139.6,93.344,72.183] 
Interruptible 
price(b) ($) 
[75,35,15] [75,35,15] [83.955,41.16,24.861] 
α 0.96699 0.90128 0.90469 
Bidding price 
($) 
[61.789,59.577,57.22
3] 
[62.169,59.143,52.538
] 
[62.015,59.996,52.034
] 
Quantity 
Cleared (MW) 
600 600 600 
Expected 
profit ($) 
7228.8 19657 24117 
Standard 
deviation ($) 
2365.8 2147.2 2280.7 
Net profit ($) 6904.9 17362 21521 
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As the scenario3 involves high profit and low deviation with low risk value it should be 
preferred for optimal bidding strategy for three blocks bidding per unit time. 
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4.1.21 Comparison between Single Block Bidding and Three Block Bidding per 
Unit Time 
Table 4.22 gives a complete comparison analysis for optimal bidding strategies for single 
block bidding (table 4.12) and three block bidding (table 4.21) per unit time in a double-
sided competitive electricity markets.  
Table ‎4.22 Comparison Analysis between SBB and TBB per unit time Optimal Bidding Strategies 
Factors 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
TBB SBB TBB SBB TBB SBB 
a ($) 
[100,80,55
] 
100 
[138.04,96.8
3, 
74.37] 
128.18 
[139.6,93.3
44, 
72.183] 
139 
b ($) [75,35,15] 75 [75,35,15] 75 
[83.955,41.
16 
,24.861] 
66.52 
α 0.96699 0.92914 0.90128 0.97366 0.90469 0.90831 
Bidding 
price ($) 
[61.789,59
.577, 
57.223] 
63.545 
[62.169,59.1
43, 
52.538] 
63.689 
[62.015,59.
996, 
52.034] 
60.859 
Quantity 
cleared 
(MW) 
600 600 600 600 600 600 
     ($) 7228.8 16118 19657 33644 24117 41486 
     ($) 2365.8 2405.2 2147.2 2366.9 2280.7 2279.7 
Net 
profit 
($) 
6904.9 14816 17362 32683 21521 37415 
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Table 4.22 shows that for single block bidding (SBB) per unit time the profits turn out to 
be maximum in all the scenarios when compared to three block bidding per unit time. 
The reason for such difference is that in SBB, the retail price at which LSE sells the 
electric power to the end customer is only one price e.g. $139 in scenario 3 for supplying 
600 MW whereas for three block bidding (TBB) per unit time it changes from one block 
to another block e.g. $[139.6, 93.344, 72.183] in scenario 3 for supplying 600 MW in the 
order of 200MW for each block. The advantage of SBB optimal bidding strategy is that it 
can draw high profits but the disadvantage is that if the single price did not clear the 
market level then the LSE is out of business and should pay the end customers the 
interruptible prices for unsupplied load as per agreement, which is a loss. Whereas for 
TBB the profit might be less when compared to SBB but it has the advantage of clearing 
block quantities in the market. It‟s on the LSE to select either of the strategies but before 
that it should ensure itself of the electricity market process and forecasted load. 
Researchers of electricity market adopt TBB or more than three block bidding per unit 
time [64-66].   
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4.2 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Transmission Constraints 
In previous sections of this chapter, the optimal bidding strategy for LSE was developed 
by neglecting the transmission constraints. This section includes the effect of 
transmission constraints on the electricity model. An IEEE-30 bus system is considered 
to study the effect of transmission constraints on the electricity market and bidding 
strategies of the LSE. The same pricing rule and price settlement process with step-wise 
price/ quantity biddings are employed. Once the optimal power flow is performed for 
IEEE-30 bus system, Monte-Carlo Simulation and GA are applied to find the optimal 
bidding strategy for LSE taking into account the effect of transmission constraints. The 
optimal bidding strategy is developed using three ways. The first strategy does not 
include contracts whereas the second strategy includes forward contract only with one 
generator and finally the third strategy is to contract with more than one generator. The 
strategies were constructed based on Single Block Bidding (SBB) and Three Block 
Bidding (TBB) as described in previous sections.  
4.2.1 Electricity Market Model 
Consider an IEEE-30 bus system with 6 Gencos and 3 LSEs for electricity pool market. 
One out of the 3 LSEs, suppose LSE at bus 27, is chosen to build optimal bidding 
strategy. 
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The participants in the pool market are distributed at different buses as shown in table 
4.23 and figure 4.5. 
Table ‎4.23 Market participants in IEEE-30 bus system 
Market Participants Bus No. 
Genco#1 1 
Genco#2 2 
Genco#3 22 
Genco#4 27 
Genco#5 23 
Genco#6 13 
LSE#1 7 
LSE#2 15 
LSE#3 27 
 
 
LSE at bus no. 27 is chosen to build the optimal bidding strategy. 
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Figure ‎4.5 Single Line Diagram of the IEEE-30 Bus test system 
 
 
 76   
 
 
In general, cost function of a generator is given by the following polynomial 
                     (4.2) 
Table 4.24 shows the generator cost functions of each generator. 
Table ‎4.24 Generator Cost Functions 
Gen 
Block1 Block2 Block3 
a 
 
 
    
  
B 
 
 
   
  
c($) 
a 
 
 
    
  
b 
 
 
   
  
c($) 
a 
 
 
    
  
b
 
 
   
  
c($) 
G1 0.02 21.5 0 0.02 49 0 0.02 59 0 
G2 0.02 20.5 0 0.02 39 0 0.02 69 0 
G3 0.02 19.5 0 0.02 47 0 0.02 59 0 
G4 0.02 22.5 0 0.02 41 0 0.02 79 0 
G5 0.02 23.5 0 0.02 45 0 0.02 74 0 
G6 0.09 85 0 0.09 90 0 0.09 95 0 
 
Each Genco has the maximum capacity of 60 MW while the forecasted load of each LSE 
is 30 MW. Each generation company can bid at most Ig blocks for each period; the block 
price must be non-decreasing with the increase of the block number. Each LSE can bid at 
most Id blocks for each period, the block price must decrease with the increase of the 
block number. 
Suppose each market participant is allowed to bid at most 3 blocks (Ig=3 and Id=3). 
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Table 4.25 shows the estimated parameters of generators. Table 4.25 also shows that the 
bidding prices for Gencos are increasing from one block to the another block, i.e. it is $22 
for Genco 1 during block 1 then $50 during block 2 and finally $60 during block 3. The 
other Gencos also follow the same increasing block prices for their supplied capacity. 
 
Table ‎4.25 Offering Parameters of Gencos 
Genco 
Block1 Block2 Block3 Variance 
MW $ MW $ MW $ MW $ 
1 12 22 24 50 24 60 5.5 2.5 
2 12 21 24 40 24 70 5.5 2.5 
3 12 23 24 42 24 80 5.5 2.5 
4 12 85 24 90 24 95 5.5 2.5 
5 12 24 24 46 24 75 5.5 2.5 
6 12 20 24 48 24 60 5.5 2.5 
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Table 4.26 shows the estimated bidding parameters of LSEs. Table 4.26 also shows that 
the bidding prices for LSEs are decreasing from one block to the another block, i.e. it is 
$100 for LSE 1 during block 1 then $70 during block 2 and finally $60 during block 3. 
The other LSEs also follow the same decreasing block prices for their supplied capacity. 
Table ‎4.26 Bidding Parameters of LSEs 
LSE 
Block1 Block2 Block3 Variance 
MW $ MW $ MW $ MW $ 
1 10 100 10 70 10 60 5.5 2.5 
2 10 100 10 50 10 20 5.5 2.5 
 
For this model, at first, OPF is run without transmission constraints and the expectation 
profit, standard deviation and net profit are calculated in the same manner as in chapter 5 
using Monte-Carlo Simulation. Then OPF is run with transmission constraints[72]. The 
nodal prices and quantity cleared at different buses are examined. Finally, optimal 
bidding strategy was developed for LSE 3 using SBB and TBB. This optimal bidding 
strategy was developed including and excluding forward contracts. 
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The bus data, line data and generation data for IEEE-30 bus system with 6 generators is 
mentioned in Appendix A of this thesis. At first, OPF program is performed without 
transmission constraints. The results of OPF without transmission constraints are given in 
Appendix B. This flow determines the nodal prices at different buses and the load cleared 
at the bus. As shown in figure 4.6, without any transmission line limits, 30 MW of load is 
cleared at bus 27. Generator at bus 27 does not produce any MW since it is the costliest 
generator. Thus, without transmission constraints, the other generators which are less 
costly than generator at bus 27 transmit MWs to the load at bus 27. The nodal price is 
found to be $79.134 at bus 27.  The various generations of generators and line flows are 
shown in the OPF bus data and OPF branch data without transmission constraints in 
Appendix B. 
 
Figure ‎4.6 Flow of the lines to bus 27 without transmission constraints 
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The different bidding strategies adopted by LSE at bus 27 with retail price $150 and 
interruptible price $110 are shown in Table 4.27. 
Table ‎4.27 Bidding Strategy without transmission constraints 
Bidding Prices ($) 
Quantity Cleared 
(MW) 
Expected Profit ($) 
Standard Deviation 
($) 
80 30 2286.7 6451.3 
90 30 1970.1 6021.9 
100 30 1654.4 5709.4 
 
LSE 3 should bid higher than the nodal price at bus 27 to clear 30 MW of load. Table 
4.27 shows that if LSE bids higher than nodal price, it clears 30 MW but further increase 
in bidding price reduce the gap between bidding price and retail price. This reduction in 
gap reduces its expected profit. 
The optimal power flow program for the electricity market model with transmission 
constraints is performed. The power flow limits on each line of an IEEE-30 bus system 
are shown in the line data for an IEEE-30 bus system in Appendix A. The results of OPF 
with transmission constraints are given in Appendix C. Generator at bus 27, is an 
expensive generator for producing power.  When there were no transmission constraints, 
generator at bus 27 does not produce because low cost generators were able to transmit 
power to bus 27. As shown in figure 4.7, due to transmission limits on the lines (line 22 
to 24 and line 24 to 25) of the network, the flow to bus 27 is limited. Thus, the low cost 
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generators are unable to transmit power to bus 27. The remaining MWs are produced by 
the generator at bus 27. This generator produces 5.04 MW and thus the nodal price at this 
bus is set by this generator and is found to be $ 85.906. The various generations of 
generators and line flows are shown in the OPF bus data and OPF branch data with 
transmission constraints in Appendix C. 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4.7  Flow of the lines to bus 27 with transmission constraints 
 
The thesis develops strategic bidding for LSE at bus 27 using SBB and TBB per unit time 
with three cases, i.e. 
1. When LSE at bus 27 does not undertake bilateral contract. 
2. When LSE at bus 27 undertake a contract with one of the available generators 
3. When LSE at bus 27 undertake contracts with more than one available generators 
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Single Bidding Block per Unit Time 
The LSE at bus 27 will bid only a single price for the all the blocks to clear 30MW. 
No Bilateral Contract 
Considering SBB per unit time and does not involve any contracts, the bidding strategies 
of LSE at bus 27 can be constructed step by step as in the chapter 5. 
4.2.2 Profits with Different Bidding Strategies with Different Weighting Factors 
Initially, the retail price is set to $150 and the interruptible price is set to $110. Maximum 
number of random sampling is set as       . The bidding strategies of rivals are 
described according to equations 3.14 and 3.16. Risk factor is increased from 0.3 to 0.9 
and Monte-Carlo Simulation is used for the calculation of expectation profit and standard 
deviation. The impact of different bidding strategies on     and      of the LSE X is 
shown in Table 4.28. 
Table ‎4.28 Profits with Different Bidding Strategies 
α 
Bidding 
Prices ($) 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation ($) 
Net Profit ($) 
0.3 80 0 -3089.7 6338.5 -5363.8 
0.6 90 30 1972.4 5951.5 1197.2 
0.9 100 30 1656.2 5686 921.94 
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It is observed from the table 4.28; if the bidding price is less than the nodal price then 
LSE will not clear any quantity and is out of business with loss. If it‟s bidding price is 
greater than the nodal price then it clear all the quantity and the profit increases. Once the 
load is cleared the high bidding prices will reduce the profit because the gap between 
bidding price and retail price reduces. Also it shows that LSE should prefer high 
weighting/risk factor to maximize profit. 
4.2.3 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Weighting Factor 
The GA optimization is applied to get the optimal bidding strategy among the results 
obtained from Monte-Carlo results of all bidding strategies. The parameters associated 
with GA are specified as Population is 100, mutation probability is 0.1, crossover 
probability is 0.8 and maximum permitted number of iterations is 100. GA optimization 
for risk factor ranging from 0 to 1 is shown in Table 4.29. 
Table ‎4.29 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Weighting Factor 
α 0.99885 
Bidding Price ($) 99.662 
Cleared Quantity (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 1665.4 
Standard Deviation ($) 2133.7 
Net Profit ($) 1657 
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4.2.4 Impact of Retail Price on Profit Maximization 
Retail price is the price at which LSEs would sell the power to the end customers. Thus, 
it is a very important factor for a LSE to maximize its profit. LSE X should choose retail 
price such that it should neither be too high such that end customers look out for other 
LSEs making LSE X out of business nor the retail price should be too low such that it 
causes LSE X to incur a loss. Using the results obtained from optimal bidding strategy for 
weighting factor, i.e. Table4.29; weighting factor (also known as risk factor) is fixed to 
0.99885 and interruptible price is fixed to $110. The values of retail prices are increased 
from $150 to $180 with increasing bidding prices. Results obtained from Monte-Carlo 
Simulation are shown in Table 4.30.  
Table ‎4.30 Impact of Retail Price on Profit Maximization 
Retail 
Price ($) 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
Bidding Price ($) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net profit 
($) 
150 0 80 -3040.4        5409.9       -3045.4 
160 30 90 2286.7        6387.6        2276.7 
180 30 100 2598.2        6687.1        2587.6 
 
Table 4.30 shows that when the bidding price is less than the nodal price then LSE will 
not clear any quantity and is out of business with loss. Table 4.30 also shows as retail 
price increases the profit of the LSE increases and also increases the deviation. . The 
increase in profit is due to increased gap between bidding price and retail price. The high 
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retail prices will encourage LSE to bid high in the market to dispatch more power. The 
increasing of retail price may cause the consumers to choose the other LSEs which offers 
low retail price. 
4.2.5 The Optimal Bidding Strategy with Retail Prices 
In order to decide whether the increased retail price which gives the LSE a large profit is 
optimal or not, GA optimization is applied with retail price ranging from $150 to$180 
with same GA parameters used in section 4.2.3. The results obtained for different 
parameters are shown in Table4.31. 
Table ‎4.31  Optimal Bidding Strategy with Retail Prices 
α 0.98235 
Retail price ($) 178.77 
Bidding Price ($) 88.163 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 2932.1 
Standard deviation ($) 2282.4 
Net profit ($) 2755.6 
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4.2.6 Impact of Interruptible Price on Profit Maximization 
The values of risk factor and retail price are fixed to the values obtained in Table 4.31. 
Monte- Carlo Simulation is performed by increasing the values of Interruptible price. 
Table ‎4.32 Impact of Interruptible Price on Profit Maximization 
Interruptible 
price ($) 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
Bidding Price ($) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net profit 
($) 
90 0 80 -2472.7                6649 -2546.4 
100 30 90 2860.6        6718.5        2691.6 
110 30 100 2531.3        6977.5        2381.1 
 
Table 4.32 shows that, when the bidding price is lower than nodal price at bus 27, the 
quantity cleared is 0 MW and LSE at bus 27 should pay end customers an interruptible 
price of $110. Thus, in this case profit is negative. Also it can be observed form Table 
4.32 that as bidding prices increases there is no effect of interruptible prices because the 
required 30 MW are fully cleared. In general, high interruptible prices force LSE to bid 
higher to dispatch the required quantity. 
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4.2.7 Optimal Bidding Strategy by GA with Retail and Interruptible Price 
GA optimization is applied with interruptible price ranging from $90 to $110 with same 
GA parameters used in section 4.2.3. Table 4.33 shows the optimal GA values obtained. 
Table ‎4.33  Optimal Bidding Strategy by GA with Retail and Interruptible Price 
α 0.97481 
Retail price ($) 179 
Interruptible price ($) 92.442 
Bidding Price ($) 88.02 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 2921.6 
Standard deviation ($) 2407.5 
Net profit ($) 2684.8 
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4.2.8 Comparison Analysis 
Table 4.34 shows the comparison of three scenarios of bidding strategies discussed in 
tables 4.29, 4.31 and 4.33. In Scenario1, the retail and interruptible prices are fixed to 
$150 and $110 respectively. The net profit using Monte-Carlo Simulation method was 
found to be $1657. In scenario2, the retail price was found to be $178.77 by the 
optimization process where as the interruptible price was still fixed to $110 and the net 
profit increased $ 2755.6. Finally, in scenario3 retail price and interruptible price were 
found to be $179 and $92.442 respectively by optimization process. The profit in 
scenario3 increased to $2527.2. 
Table ‎4.34  Comparison Analysis 
Factors Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Retail price ($) 150 178.77 179 
Interruptible price($) 110 110 92.442 
α 0.99885 0.98235 0.97481 
Bidding price ($) 99.662 88.163 88.02 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 30 30 
Expected profit ($) 1665.4 2932.1 2933.4 
Standard deviation ($) 2133.7 2282.4 2207.5 
Net profit ($) 1657 2755.6 2527.2 
 
As the scenario3 involves high profit (less than scenario 2 with high risk) and low 
deviation with low risk value it should be preferred for optimal bidding strategy for single 
block bidding per unit time. 
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Bilateral Contract with One of the Available Generators 
The results of different variations in the prices of LSE at bus 27 due to variations in the 
production of generators at different buses are shown in table 4.35. Generators at bus 13 
and at bus 23 were selected for optimal bidding strategy for LSE at bus 27. The reason 
for selecting only generators at bus 13 and at bus 23 is that the absence of these 
generators makes the generator at bus 27 to produce more MW which results in high 
prices (i.e., $93.813 if generator at bus 13 produces only 12 MW and $94.256 if the 
generator at bus 27 produces only 12 MW) as shown in table 4.35. So, in order to avoid 
such high prices, LSE at bus 27 may consider signing a contract with generators at bus 13 
and at bus 23. As in case2, LSE at bus 27 has to undertake contract only with one 
generator, it would be generator at bus 13 since it provides more MW (i.e. 25 MW) to 
LSE at low prices when compared to generator at bus 23. In case3, LSE is allowed to 
contract with more than one generators available i.e. generators at bus 13 and at bus 23. 
The comparative results are shown in section 4.36. The contract settlements for these two 
parties are shown in Appendix D.  
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Table  4.35 Variations in prices at bus 27 due to variations in production at different generator buses 
Generator 
G1 
(MW) 
G2 
(MW) 
G13 
(MW) 
G22 
(MW) 
G23 
(MW) 
G27 
(MW) 
Load at 
bus 27 
(MW) 
Nodal 
Price at 
bus 27 
($) 
G1 12 60 60 59.3 46.18 18.58 30 91.185 
 36 60 60 38.9 50.34 11.29 30 87.033 
 60 57.14 60 36 39.13 5.04 30 85.906 
G2 60 12 60 59.4 46.17 18.74 30 91.213 
 60 36 60 39 50.32 11.39 30 87.05 
 58.01 60 60 36 37.66 5.62 30 86.012 
G13 60 60 12 55.68 36.08 33.18 30 93.813 
 60 60 36 45.54 46.34 9.37 30 86.686 
 60 57.14 60 36 39.13 5.04 30 85.916 
G22 60 60 60 12 52.28 12.83 30 90.150 
 60 57.14 60 36 39.13 5.04 30 85.906 
 37.22 36 59.29 60 45.47 18.20 30 91.117 
G23 60 56.26 57.94 36 12 35.64 30 94.256 
 60 58.59 60 36 36 6.69 30 86.205 
G27 60 52.83 60 36 36 12 30 87.159 
 51.39 36 60 36 36 36 30 95.00 
 36 36 50.85 36 36 60 30 99.89 
 
All generations are in MW and prices are in $. 
Consider that LSE 3 would sign a contract with generator at bus 13 for the supply of 25 
MW at bus27. The contract price is a compromise between these two parties and an 
average price of $78 is always the best contract price. LSE 3 also owns the Financial 
Transmission Rights (FTRs) between bus 13 and bus 27 at a price equal to difference in 
nodal prices of bus 13 and bus 27  i.e., $15.789. Contract details are shown in Appendix 
D. The bidding strategy for LSE at bus 27 with a single contract is obtained step by step 
from following sections. 
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4.2.9 Profits with Different Bidding Strategies 
The impact of different bidding strategies on     and      of the LSE X is shown in 
Table 4.36 
Table ‎4.36 Profits with different bidding strategies 
Bidding Prices 
($) 
Quantity Cleared 
(MW) 
Expected Profit 
($) 
Standard Deviation 
($) 
80 25 1665.3 8320.1 
90 30 2357.9 8242.3 
100 30 2309.5 8223.7 
 
Table 4.36 shows that at least a quantity of 25 MW will be cleared at bus 27 even though 
the price is less than nodal price at bus 27. This is because of contract between generator 
at bus 13 and LSE at bus 27. The remaining will be cleared by LSE using its bidding 
strategies where its bidding prices are greater than nodal prices. In this case, LSE will not 
be exposed to any kind of loss. 
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4.2.10  Impact of Different Weighting Factor on Bidding Strategies 
The impact of different Weighting or risk factor on bidding strategies of the LSE X is 
shown in Table 4.37 
Table ‎4.37 Impact of Different Weighting Factor on Bidding Strategies 
α 
Bidding 
Prices ($) 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation ($) 
Net Profit ($) 
0.3 80 25 1665.3 8320.1 1665.3 
0.6 90 30 2357.9 8242.3 1882.2 
0.9 100 30 2309.5 8223.7 1811.76 
 
Table4.37 shows that increasing risk factor, with increasing bidding prices, increases the 
net profit of LSE. The contract of 25 MW always results in profit even though the 
bidding price is less than the nodal price. For the LSE, to clear remaining 5 MW from the 
market, it should bid high with high factor of risk. 
4.2.11 Optimal Bidding Strategy with weighting Factor 
GA optimization with weighting factor ranging from 0 to 1 is applied to get optimum 
value for weighting factor. The parameters used for GA are the same used before. The 
optimized solution of GA is shown in Table 4.38 
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Table ‎4.38 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Weighting Factor 
α 0.99171 
Bidding price ($) 98.746 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 2372.0 
Standard Deviation ($) 2026.7 
Net Profit ($) 2284.0 
 
4.2.12 Impact of Retail Price on Profit Maximization 
Using the results obtained from optimal bidding strategy for weighting factor, i.e. 
Table4.38; risk factor is fixed to 0.99171 and interruptible price is set to $110. The values 
of retail prices are increased from $150 to $180 with bidding prices. The results obtained 
from Monte-Carlo Simulation are shown in Table4.39 
Table ‎4.39 Impact of Retail Price on Profit Maximization 
Retail 
Price ($) 
Quantity 
(MW) 
Bidding 
Price ($) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net profit 
($) 
150 25 80    1571.1        8389.5 1571.1 
160 30 90 2712.4        8648.8   2595.0 
180 30 100 3285.3        8846.7 3188.3 
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Table4.39 shows as retail price increases the profit of the LSE increases and also 
increases the deviation. The increase in profit is due to increased gap between bidding 
price and retail price. The high retail prices will encourage LSE to bid high in the market 
to dispatch more power. The increasing of retail price may cause the consumers to choose 
the other LSEs which offers low retail price. 
4.2.13 The Optimal Bidding Strategy with Retail Prices 
GA optimization with retail prices ranging from 150 to 180 is applied to get optimum 
value for retail price. The parameters used for GA are the same used before. The 
optimized solution of GA is shown in Table 4.40. 
Table ‎4.40  Optimal Bidding Strategy with Retail Prices 
α 0.98735 
Retail price ($) 179.41 
Bidding Price ($) 87.263 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 3291.5 
Standard deviation ($) 2235.9 
Net profit ($) 3132.0 
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4.2.14 Impact of Interruptible Price on Profit Maximization 
The values of risk factor and retail price are set to the values obtained in Table4.40. By 
increasing the values of Interruptible price the Monte- Carlo Simulation is performed.  
Table ‎4.41 Impact of Interruptible Price on Profit Maximization 
Interruptible 
price ($) 
Quantity 
(MW) 
Bidding Price 
($) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net profit 
($) 
90 25 80 2405.1                8665 2405.1 
100 30 90   3322.7        8866.6 3127.9 
110 30 100 3253.6 8639.3 3103.1 
 
Table 4.41 shows that as bidding prices increases there is no effect of interruptible prices 
because the required 30 MW are cleared. In general, high interruptible prices force LSE 
to bid higher to dispatch the required quantity. 
4.2.15 Optimal Bidding Strategy by GA with Retail and Interruptible Price 
GA optimization with interruptible price ranging from 90 to 110 is applied to get 
optimum value for interruptible price. The parameters used for GA are the same used 
before. The optimized solution of GA is shown in Table 4.42 
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Table ‎4.42  Optimal Bidding Strategy by GA with Retail and Interruptible Price 
α 0.957 
Retail price ($) 179.22 
Interruptible price ($) 93.989 
Bidding Price ($) 87.76 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 3311.3 
Standard deviation ($) 2207.5 
Net profit ($) 2789.2 
 
4.2.16 Comparison Analysis 
Table 4.43 shows the comparison of three scenarios discussed in tables 4.38, 4.40 and 
4.42 three scenarios can be studied as shown in table 4.19. In Scenario1, the retail and 
interruptible prices are fixed to $150 and $110 respectively. The net profit using Monte-
Carlo Simulation method was found to be $2284.0. In scenario2, the retail price was 
changed to $179.41 by the optimization process where as the interruptible price was still 
fixed to $110 and the net profit increased to $ 3132.0. Finally, in scenario3 retail price 
and interruptible price were found to be $179.22 and $93.989 respectively by 
optimization process. The profit in scenario3 increased to $2789.2. 
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Table ‎4.43 Comparison Analysis 
Factors Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Retail price ($) 150 179.41 179.22 
Interruptible price 
($) 
110 110 93.989 
α 0.99171 0.98735 0.957 
Bidding price ($) 98.746 87.263 87.76 
Quantity Cleared ($) 30 30 30 
Expected profit ($) 2372.0 3291.5 3311.3 
Standard deviation 
($) 
2026.7 2235.9 2207.5 
Net profit ($) 2284.0 3132.0 2789.2 
 
As the scenario3 involves high profit (less than scenario 2 with high risk) and low 
deviation with low risk value it should be preferred for optimal bidding strategy for single 
block bidding per unit time. 
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4.2.17 Comparison of SBB with and without Contract 
Table 4.44 shows comparison of SBB with and without contract from tables 4.43 and 
4.34. 
Table ‎4.44 Comparison of SBB with and without contract 
Factors 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
SBB with 
Contract 
SBB 
without 
Contract 
SBB 
with 
Contract 
SBB 
without 
Contract 
SBB with 
Contract 
SBB 
without 
Contract 
Retail price 150 150 179.41 178.77 179.22 179 
Interruptible 
price 
110 110 110 110 93.989 92.442 
α 0.99171 0.99885 0.98735 0.98235 0.957 0.97481 
Bidding price 98.746 99.662 87.263 88.163 87.76 88.02 
Expected 
profit 
2372.0 1665.4 3291.5 2932.1 3311.3 2933.4 
Standard 
deviation 
2026.7 2133.7 2235.9 2282.4 2407.5 2207.5 
Net profit 2284.0 1657 3132.0 2755.6 2789.2 2527.2 
 
It is observed from table 4.44 that the profit obtained by LSE 3 at bus 27 while 
constructing optimal bidding strategy with contractual tools is more when compared to 
optimal bidding strategy without contracts. Hence LSEs at buses should undertake 
contracts in order to avoid price fluctuations at nodes and also to maximize their profit 
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Bilateral Contracts with More than One Available Generators 
When LSE at bus 27 undertakes bilateral trading of 26 MW with generator at bus 13 for 
$78 and a trade of 4 MW with generator at 23 for $82 then the optimal bidding strategy 
using SBB for LSE at 27 is shown in table 4.45. The settlement of contracts is shown in 
Appendix D. In scenario1, retail price and interruptible price are fixed to $150 and $110 
respectively. The net profit in scenario 1 was found to be $2124.2. In scenario2, the 
optimal retail price was found to be $179.41 and interruptible price is fixed to $110 and 
net profit was found to be $ 29654. In scenario3, the optimal retail and interruptible 
prices were found to be $179.22 and $ 93.989 with a net profit of $2775.5. 
Table ‎4.45 optimal bidding strategy using forward contracts with two generators 
Factors Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Retail price ($) 150 179.41 179.22 
Interruptible price ($) 110 110 93.989 
α 0.99171 0.98735 0.957 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 30 30 
Expected profit ($) 2160.0 3291.5 3036.6 
Standard deviation ($) 2160.3 2090.5 2070.2 
Net profit ($) 2124.2 29654 2775.5 
 
The table 4.45 shows that the profit obtained from contracting with more than one 
available generator increases the profit of LSE at bus 27 when compared to no contract 
and contract with only one out of available generators analysis. This increase in profit is 
due to no high bidding prices involved and low price contracts provided by the 
generators. 
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Three Block Bidding per Unit Time 
The LSE at bus 27 will bid different prices for each block to clear 30 MW. 
No Bilateral Contract 
Considering TBB per unit time and does not involving any contracts, the bidding 
strategies of LSE at bus 27 can be constructed step by step in same way as done for SBB. 
Without transmission constraints Nodal Price at bus 27 was found to be $79.134.  
4.2.18 Profits with Different Bidding Strategies 
Initially, the retail price is set to $[150,120, 100] and the interruptible price is set to 
$[110, 85, 70]. Maximum number of random samples are set to        and the 
bidding strategies of rivals are described according to equations 3.14 and 3.16 [64-
66].The expectation profit and standard deviation for different bidding strategies by LSE 
at bus 27 when transmission constraints are neglected are given by the table 4.46. 
Table ‎4.46 Profits with Different Bidding Strategies 
Bidding Prices ($) 
Quantity Cleared 
(MW) 
Expected Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation ($) 
[100,60,50] 10 -904 5082.7 
[100,80,70] 20 316.6 4580 
[100,90,80] 30 1098.3 4402 
[120,90,80] 30 888.6 4179 
 
The quantity is cleared depending upon the bidding price per block. Table 4.26 shows 
initially the profit of LSE is negative because the quantity cleared when bidding with 
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$[100, 60, 50] is only 10 MW. The LSE has to pay the end customers the interruptible 
price for the un-cleared quantity i.e. 20 MW according interruptible contracts. Table 4.26 
also shows that as the bidding prices increases the profit of LSE increases. Once the total 
quantity is cleared interruptible load will have no effect on the profit of LSE. If the 
bidding prices are further increased then the profit of LSE will decrease since the gap 
between retail and bidding price decreases. 
Nodal price at bus 27 with transmission constraints was found to be $85.906. 
4.2.19 Profits with Different Bidding Strategies and Weighting Factors 
The expectation profit and standard deviation for different bidding strategies with 
different weighting factors for LSE at bus 27 when transmission constraints are taken into 
account are given by the table 4.47. 
Table ‎4.47 Profits with Different Bidding Strategies 
α 
Bidding 
Prices ($) 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation ($) 
Net Profit ($) 
0.3 [100,60,50] 10 -902.6 5112.5 -1323.6 
0.6 [100,90,80] 20 206.1 4395.6 -254 
0.9 [120,100,90] 30 678.4 3932.6 217.3 
 
Negative values of expected profit and net profit in table 4.47 show that when bidding 
lower price at lower factor of risk will make the LSE at bus 27 undergo loss since the 
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cleared quantity is only 10MW and risk factor is very low. Table 4.47 also shows that, 
when LSE increases its factor of risk, with increasing bidding prices, the profit increases. 
Thus, LSEs when bidding should always prefer to bid high with high factor of risk in 
order to maximize their net profit. 
4.2.20 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Weighting Factor 
The GA optimization is applied to get the optimal bidding strategy among the results 
obtained from Monte-Carlo results of all bidding strategies. The parameters associated 
with GA are specified as Population is 100, mutation probability is 0.1, crossover 
probability is 0.8 and maximum permitted number of iterations is 100. GA optimization 
for risk factor ranging from 0 to 1 is shown in Table 4.48. 
Table ‎4.48 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Weighting Factor 
α 0.99539 
Bidding price ($) [117.53, 95.249,88.879] 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 747.05 
Standard Deviation ($) 2450.8 
Net Profit ($) 724.87 
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4.2.21 Impact of Retail Price on Profit Maximization 
Using the results obtained from optimal bidding strategy for weighting factor, i.e. Table 
4.48; risk factor is fixed to 0.99539 and interruptible price is fixed to $[110, 90, 75]. The 
values of retail prices are increased from $[150,120,100] to $[180,160,140] with bidding 
prices. Results obtained from Monte-Carlo Simulation are shown in Table 4.49 
Table ‎4.49 Impact of Retail Price on Profit Maximization 
Retail Price 
($) 
Quantity 
(MW) 
Bidding Price ($)  
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net profit 
($) 
[150,120,100] 10 [100,60,50] -904.17        5098.1       -923.51 
[160,140,120] 20 [100,90,80] 531.84        5083.6        505.95 
[180,160,140] 30 [120,100,90] 1833.3        5181.1        1800.9 
 
The reason for negative profit is same as mentioned in section 4.2.19. Table4.49 shows as 
retail price increases the profit of the LSE increases. This encourages LSE to bid high 
with high retail price in order to maximize the overall profit. The increasing of retail price 
may cause the consumers to choose the other LSEs which offers low retail price. 
4.2.22 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Retail Prices 
The GA optimization is applied to get the optimal bidding strategy among the results 
obtained from Monte-Carlo results of all bidding strategies. The parameters associated 
with GA are specified as Population is 100, mutation probability is 0.1, crossover 
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probability is 0.8 and maximum permitted number of iterations is 100. GA optimization 
for retail price ranging from [150,120,100] to [180,160,140] is shown in Table 4.50. 
Table ‎4.50  Optimal Bidding Strategy with Retail Prices 
α 0.97178 
Retail price ($) [177.07, 153.37,132.31] 
Bidding Price ($) [109.84, 94.991,88.041] 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 1700 
Standard deviation ($) 2133.2 
Net profit ($) 1504 
 
4.2.23  Impact of Interruptible Price on Profit Maximization 
The values of risk factor and retail price are fixed to the values obtained in Table 4.50. 
By increasing the values of Interruptible price with bidding price Monte- Carlo 
Simulation is applied and the results are shown in table 4.51. 
Table ‎4.51 Impact of Interruptible Price on Profit Maximization 
Interruptible 
price ($) 
Quantity 
(MW) 
Bidding Price ($) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net profit 
($) 
[90,65,50] 10 [100,60,50]     -215.05        5437.2       -362.42 
[100,75,60] 20 [100,90,80] 942.92        5221.1        768.97 
[110,85,70] 30 [120,100,90]   1650.8        5009.9        1462.8 
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It can be observed form Table4.51 that as interruptible prices to end consumers decrease 
the net profit of a LSE. Also it can be observed form Table 4.51 that as bidding prices 
increases there is no effect of interruptible prices because the required 30 MW are cleared 
which means there is no interruptible load. In general, high interruptible prices tend LSE 
to bid higher to dispatch the required quantity. 
4.2.24 Optimal Bidding Strategy by GA with Retail and Interruptible Price 
The GA optimization is applied to get the optimal interruptible price. The GA parameters 
are same as used before. Table 4.52 shows the optimal value of interruptible price. 
Table ‎4.52  Optimal Bidding Strategy by GA with Retail and Interruptible Price 
α 0.97481 
Retail price ($) [178.04,158.14,133.79] 
Interruptible price ($) [88.714,74.476,59.116] 
Bidding Price ($) [117.7, 92.422,88.459] 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 1827.9 
Standard deviation ($) 2107.5 
Net profit ($) 1662.8 
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4.2.25 Comparison Analysis 
Table 4.53 shows the comparison of three scenarios discussed in tables 4.48, 4.50 and 
4.52. In Scenario1, the retail and interruptible prices are fixed to $[150, 100, 75] and 
$[110, 85, 70] respectively. The net profit using Monte-Carlo Simulation method was 
found to be 724.87. In scenario2, the retail price was changed to $[177.07, 153.37, 
132.31] by the optimization process where as the interruptible price was still fixed to 
$[110, 85, 70] and the net profit increased to $1504. Finally, in scenario3 retail price and 
interruptible price were changed to $[178.04, 158.14, 133.79] and $[88.714, 74.476, 
59.116] respectively by optimization process. The profit in scenario3 increased to 
$1662.8. 
Table ‎4.53  Comparison Analysis 
Factors Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Retail price 
($) 
[150,120,100] [177.07 153.37,132.31] [178.04,158.14,133.79] 
Interruptible 
price ($) 
[110,85,70] [110,85,70] [88.714,74.476,59.116] 
α 0.99539 0.97178 0.97481 
Bidding price 
($) 
[117.53,95.249,88.87
9] 
[109.84,94.991,88.041] [117.7, 92.422,88.459] 
Expected 
profit ($) 
747.05 1700 1827.9 
Standard 
deviation ($) 
2450.8 2133.2 2107.5 
Net profit ($) 724.87 1504 1662.8 
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As the scenario3 involves high profit and low deviation with low risk value it should be 
preferred for optimal bidding strategy for three blocks bidding per unit time. 
Bilateral Contract with One of the Available Generators 
Consider that LSE 3 would sign a contract with generator at bus 13 for the supply of 25 
MW at bus27. The contract price is a compromise between these two parties and an 
average price of $78 is always the best contract price. LSE 3 also owns the Financial 
Transmission Rights (FTRs) between bus 13 and bus 27 at a price equal to difference in 
nodal prices of bus 13 and bus 27  i.e., $15.789. Contract details are shown in Appendix 
D. The bidding strategy for LSE at bus 27 with a single contract is obtained step by step 
from following sections. 
4.2.26 Profits with Different Bidding Strategies 
Monte-Carlo Simulation is performed to find the profits with different bidding strategies 
with weighting factor ranging from 0.3 to 0.9 as shown in table 4.54. 
Table ‎4.54 Profits with Different Bidding Strategies 
α 
Bidding Prices 
($) 
Quantity 
Cleared (MW) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation ($) 
0.3 [100,60,50] 28 1235.3 5155.5 
0.6 [100,90,80] 29 1321.1 4400.6 
0.9 [100,95,90] 30 1387.7 4297.0 
 
Table 4.54 shows that at least a quantity of 25MW will be cleared at bus 27 even though 
the price is less than nodal price at bus 27 by forward contracts. The remaining will be 
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cleared by LSE using its bidding strategies where its bidding prices are greater than nodal 
prices. In this case, LSE will not be exposed to any kind of loss. 
4.2.27 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Weighting Factor 
GA optimization is performed with weighting factor ranging from 0 to 1. The parameters 
used for GA are the same used before. 
Table ‎4.55 Optimal Bidding Strategy with Weighting Factor 
α 0.99911 
Bidding price ($)  [118.8, 97.286,88.411] 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 1289.9 
Standard Deviation ($) 2452.2 
Net Profit ($) 1285.2 
 
4.2.28 Impact of Retail Price on Profit Maximization 
Using the results obtained from optimal bidding strategy for weighting factor, i.e. Table 
4.55; risk factor to is fixed to 0.99911. The values of retail prices are increased from 
$[150,120,100] to $1[180,160,140] with bidding prices. Results obtained from Monte-
Carlo Simulation are shown in Table 4.56. 
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Table ‎4.56 Impact of Retail Price on Profit Maximization 
Retail Price 
($) 
Quantity 
(MW) 
Bidding Price ($)  
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net profit 
($) 
[150,120,100] 28 [100,60,50] 1236.1        5081.7        1230.5 
[160,140,120] 29 [100,90,80] 1825.9        5048.9        1819.8 
[180,160,140] 30 [100,95,90] 2541.7        5594.9        2534.4 
 
Table4.56 shows as retail price increases the profit of the LSE increases. This encourages 
LSE to bid high with high retail price in order to maximize the overall profit. The 
increasing of retail price may cause the consumers to choose the other LSEs which offers 
low retail price. 
4.2.29 The Optimal Bidding Strategy with Retail Price 
GA optimization is performed with retail prices ranging from [150,120,100] to 
[180,160,140]. The parameters used for GA are the same used before. 
Table ‎4.57  Optimal Bidding Strategy with Retail Prices 
α 0.99321 
Retail price ($) [179.93,143.29,139.91] 
Bidding Price ($) [109.85,97.142,88.841] 
Cleared Quantity (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 2312.6 
Standard deviation ($) 2439.1 
Net profit ($) 2261.2 
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4.2.30 Impact of Interruptible Price on Profit Maximization 
The values of risk factor and retail price are set to the values obtained in Table 4.57. 
Monte- Carlo Simulation is applied by increasing the values of Interruptible price along 
with bidding price. Table 4.58 shows the results obtained. 
Table ‎4.58 Impact of Interruptible Price on Profit Maximization 
Interruptible 
price ($) 
Quantity 
(MW) 
Bidding Price ($) 
Expected 
Profit ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($) 
Net profit 
($) 
[90,65,50] 28 [100,60,50] 2161.2        5397.5        2109.8 
[100,75,60] 29 [100,90,80] 2253.9        5115.4        2203.8 
[110,85,70] 30 [100,95,90] 2367        5254.4        2315.2 
 
Table 4.58 shows that as bidding prices increase the effect of interruptible prices decrease 
because the required 30 MW are cleared which means there is no interruptible load. In 
general, high interruptible prices force LSE to bid higher to dispatch the required 
quantity. 
4.2.31 Optimal Bidding Strategy by GA with Retail and Interruptible Price 
GA optimization is performed with interruptible prices ranging from [90,65,50] to 
[110,85,70]. The parameters used for GA are the same used before. 
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Table ‎4.59  Optimal Bidding Strategy by GA with Retail and Interruptible Price 
α 0.96248 
Retail price ($) [178.88,153.89,135.24] 
Interruptible price ($) [84.347,75.056,56.611] 
Bidding Price ($) [100.23,94.056,89.025] 
Quantity Cleared (MW) 30 
Expected Profit ($) 2275.6 
Standard deviation ($) 2407.5 
Net profit ($) 2014.0 
 
4.2.32 Comparison Analysis 
Table 4.60 shows a comparison analysis of three scenarios discussed in tables 4.55, 4.57 
and 4.59 the comparison done is shown in table 4.36. In Scenario1, the retail and 
interruptible prices are fixed to $[150, 100, 75] and $[110, 85, 70] respectively. The net 
profit using Monte-Carlo Simulation method was found to be $1285.2. In scenario2, the 
retail price was changed to $[179.93, 143.29, 139.91] by the optimization process where 
as the interruptible price was still fixed to $[110, 85, 70] and the net profit increased $ 
2261.2. Finally, in scenario3 retail price and interruptible price were changed to 
$[178.88, 153.89, 135.24] and $[84.347, 75.056, 56.611] respectively by optimization 
process. The profit in scenario3 increased to 2014.0. 
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Table ‎4.60  Comparison Analysis 
Factors Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Retail price 
($) 
[150,120,100] [179.93,143.29,139.91] [178.88,153.89,135.24] 
Interruptible 
price ($) 
[110,85,70] [110,85,70] [84.347,75.056,56.611] 
α 0.99911 0.99321 0.96248 
Quantity 
Cleared 
(MW) 
30 30 30 
Bidding price 
($) 
[118.8,97.286,88.411] [109.85,97.142,88.841] [100.23,94.056,89.025] 
Expected 
profit ($) 
1289.9 2312.6 2275.6 
Standard 
deviation ($) 
2452.2 2439.1 2407.5 
Net profit ($) 1285.2 2261.2 2014.0 
 
As the scenario3 involves high profit (less than scenario 2 with high risk) and low 
deviation with low risk value it should be preferred for optimal bidding strategy for single 
block bidding per unit time. 
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4.2.33 Comparison of TBB with and without Contract 
Table 4.61 shows comparison of TBB with and without contract discussed in tables 4.53 
and 4.60. 
Table ‎4.61 Comparison of TBB with and without Contract 
Factors 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
TBB 
with 
Contract 
TBB 
without 
Contract 
TBB with 
Contract 
TBB 
without 
Contract 
TBB with 
Contract 
TBB 
without 
Contract 
a ($) 
[150,120,
100] 
[150,100,
75] 
[179.93,14
3.29,139.9
1] 
[177.07 
153.37,132.3
1] 
[178.88,15
3.89,135.2
4] 
[178.04,15
8.14,133.7
9] 
b ($) 
[110,85,7
0] 
[110,85,7
0] 
[110,85,70
] 
[110,85,70] 
[84.347,75.
056,56.611
] 
[88.714,74.
476,59.116
] 
α 0.99911 0.99539 0.99321 0.97178 0.96248 0.97481 
Bidding 
price 
($) 
[118.8,97
.286,88.4
11] 
[117.53,9
5.249,88.
879] 
[109.85,97
.142,88.84
1] 
[109.84,94.9
91,88.041] 
[100.23,94.
056,89.025
] 
[117.7, 
92.422,88.
459] 
     
($) 
1289.9 747.05 2312.6 1700 2275.6 1827.9 
     
($) 
2452.2 2450.8 2439.1 2133.2 2407.5 2407.5 
Net 
profit 
($) 
1285.2 724.87 2261.2 1504 2014.0 1662.8 
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It is observed from the  table 4.61 that the profit obtained by LSE 3 at bus 27 while 
constructing optimal bidding strategy with contractual tools is more when compared to 
optimal bidding strategy without contracts. Hence LSEs at buses should undertake 
contracts in order to avoid price fluctuations at nodes and also to maximize their profit.  
4.2.34 Comparison of TBB and SBB with One Contract 
Table 4.62 shows the comparison between SBB and TBB per unit time involving bilateral 
contracts with one of available generators discussed in tables 4.43 and 4.60.  
Table ‎4.62 Comparison of TBB and SBB with Contract 
Factors 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
TBB with 
Contract 
SBB with 
Contract 
TBB with 
Contract 
SBB 
with 
Contract 
TBB with 
Contract 
SBB 
with 
Contract 
a ($) 
[150,120,1
00] 
150 
[179.93,143.
29,139.91] 
179.41 
[178.88,153.
89,135.24] 
179.22 
b ($) [110,85,70] 110 [110,85,70] 110 
[84.347,75.0
56,56.611] 
93.989 
α 0.99911 0.99171 0.99321 0.98735 0.96248 0.957 
Bidding 
price 
($) 
[118.8,97.2
86,88.411] 
98.746 
[109.85,97.1
42,88.841] 
87.263 
[100.23,94.0
56,89.025] 
87.76 
     
($) 
1289.9 2372.0 2312.6 3291.5 2275.6 3311.3 
     
($) 
2452.2 2026.7 2439.1 2235.9 2407.5 2407.5 
Net 
profit 
($) 
1285.2 2284.0 2261.2 3132.0 2014.0 2789.2 
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The comparison shows that for single block bidding per unit time the profits turn out to 
be maximum in all the scenarios when compared to three block bidding per unit time. 
The reason for such difference is that in SBB the retail price at which LSE sells the 
electric power to the end customer is only one price e.g. $179.22 for scenario 3 for 
supplying 30 MW whereas for TBB it changes from block to block e.g. 
$[178.88,153.89,135.24] for supplying 30 MW in the order of 10MW for each block. The 
advantage of SBB optimal bidding strategy is that it can draw high profits but the 
disadvantage is that if the single price did not clear the market level then the LSE is out 
of business from the market and can clear the quantities only agreed on contracts. Thus it 
should pay the end customers the interruptible prices for the whole load as per agreement 
which is a loss. Whereas for TBB the profit might be less when compared to SBB but it 
has the advantage of clearing block quantities in the market according to its block 
bidding. It‟s on the LSE to select either of the strategies but before that it should ensure 
itself of the electricity market process and forecasted load. Researchers of electricity 
market adopt TBB or more than three block bidding per unit time to construct bidding 
strategies of market participants.   
Bilateral Contracts with More than One Available Generators 
When LSE at bus 27 undertakes bilateral trading of 26 MW with generator at bus 13 for 
$78 and a trade of 4 MW with generator at 23 for $82 then the optimal bidding strategy 
using SBB for LSE at 27 is shown in table 4.63. The settlement of contracts is shown in 
Appendix D. In scenario1, retail price and interruptible price are fixed to $[150,120,100] 
and $[110, 85, 70] respectively. The net profit in scenario 1 was found to be $1357.6. In 
scenario2, the optimal retail price was found to be $[179.93, 143.29, 139.91] and 
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interruptible price is fixed to $[110, 85, 70] and net profit was found to be $ 2260. In 
scenario3, the optimal retail and interruptible prices were found to be $[178.88, 153.89, 
135.24] and $ [84.347, 75.056, 56.611] with a net profit of $2172.9. 
Table ‎4.63 Optimal bidding strategy using forward contracts with two generators 
Factors Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Retail price ($) [150,120,100] [179.93,143.29,139.91] [178.88,153.89,135.24] 
Interruptible 
price ($) 
[110,85,70] [110,85,70] [84.347,75.056,56.611] 
α 0.99911 0.99321 0.96248 
Expected profit 
($) 1360 
2291.3 
2340.1 
Standard 
deviation ($) 2452.2 
2291.6 
2340.4 
Net profit ($) 1357.6 2260 2172.9 
 
 
4.2.35  Comparison of TBB and SBB with More than One Contract 
Table 4.64 shows the comparison of TBB and SBB with more than one contract from 
tables 4.63 and 4.55. 
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Table ‎4.64 Comparison of TBB and SBB with More than One Contract 
Factors 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
TBB with 
Contract 
SBB 
with 
Contract 
TBB with 
Contract 
SBB 
with 
Contract 
TBB with 
Contract 
SBB 
with 
Contract 
a ($) [150,120,100
] 150 
[179.93,14
3.29,139.9
1] 179.41 
[178.88,153.
89,135.24] 
179.22 
b ($) 
[110,85,70] 110 [110,85,70] 110 
[84.347,75.0
56,56.611] 93.989 
α 
0.99911 0.99171 0.99321 0.98735 0.96248 0.957 
     
($) 1360 2160.0 2291.3 3291.5 2340.1 3036.6 
     
($) 2452.2 2160.3 2291.6 2090.5 2340.4 2070.2 
Net 
profit 
($) 1357.6 2124.2 2260 29654 2172.9 
2775.5 
 
The comparison shows that for single block bidding per unit time the profits turn out to 
be maximum in all the scenarios when compared to three block bidding per unit time. 
The reasons for such differences are same as mentioned in section 4.1.21. Out of all the 
comparisons made in Tables 4.44, 4.61, 4.63 and 4.64, the optimal bidding strategy 
constructed for LSE at bus 27 provides maximum profit when it undertakes bilateral 
trading with generators at bus 13 and at bus 23. The reason for this is that bilateral trading 
avoids the risk of price fluctuations that may occur due to transmission constraints in the 
network.  
 118   
 
 
CHAPTER 5  
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
The thesis presents a literature review on electricity markets, electricity pricing rules and 
pricing settlements. Literature survey on demand side participation and its importance are 
documented. Different perspectives on accomplishment of DSP with respect to market 
participants were studied. The effects of transmission constraints on electricity market 
and the techniques used to manage transmission constraints are also documented. Finally, 
the various approaches of strategic bidding of market participants were discussed. 
An optimal bidding strategy for LSEs is developed for a pool based double-sided auction 
electricity market covering two models. The first model neglects the effect of 
transmission constraints whereas the second model takes into account the impacts of 
transmission constraints on the profit of LSEs. In this market, sealed auction with pay-as-
bid (PAB) settlement and step-wise bidding protocols are used. The bidding behaviors of 
rivals are represented as stochastic variables of normal probability distributions. The 
problem is then formulated as a multi-objective stochastic optimization model and solved 
by a Monte-Carlo Simulation and Genetic Algorithm (GA).  
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When there are no transmission constraints for a market model of 3 Gencos and 4 LSEs, 
the results obtained conclude that an LSE competing in double-sided electricity market 
should bid high and increase its retail price to the end customers in order to maximize its 
profit. Bidding high will reduce its profit but also reduces its risks of bidding-decision. 
Retail prices must not be increased so highly that customers may opt for other LSEs. LSE 
may also reduce its risk of bidding –decision by having higher proportion of important 
type of load customers. A comparative study is done to show the importance of TBB per 
unit time. It is shown that three block bidding (TBB) per unit time is more preferable than 
single block bidding (SBB) because TBB can clear the block quantities block wise with 
decreasing prices. Whereas, in SBB if market clearing price is greater than the single bid 
price then LSE will not clear any quantity from the market.  
The techniques to manage transmission constraints are documented in the thesis.  When 
the effects of transmission constraints are considered in the electricity model of IEEE-30 
bus system, forward contracts are undertaken with generators at bus 13 and at bus 23 
while building an optimal bidding strategy. At first, Optimal bidding strategy was 
constructed without forward contracts and then with forward contracts. The profit drawn 
from the bidding strategy constructed by considering contract between LSE at bus 27 and 
generators at bus 13, bus 23 was more profitable than bidding strategy without contracts. 
The reason for this increased profit was contract signed at low price increased the gap 
between retail price and a guarantee of clearing all MWs form contracted generators. A 
comparative study with TBB per unit time and SBB per unit time using forward contracts 
was done and the results shows that TBB per unit time bidding strategy is more effective 
than SBB per unit time. 
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5.2 Future Work 
The further issues that can be addressed on building optimal bidding strategy are 
 The effect of generator failure on the electricity market and on the profit of LSE 
can also be studied. 
 Further study could include the impact of investing in generation and transmission 
by an LSE on strategic bidding.  
 Management of ancillary services by an LSE in electricity markets can be studied.  
 The bidding strategy can also be developed by using fuzzy theory and game 
theory approach and a comparative study can be done. 
 Optimal bidding strategy can be developed for a micro-grid in the competitive 
electricity markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 121   
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Bus data for IEEE-30 bus system 
Bus 
No. 
Type 
Voltage Load 
Magnitude (pu) Angle  P (MW) Q (MVAR) 
1 3 1 0 0 0 
2 2 1 0 5.04 2.96 
3 1 1 0 22.32 11.16 
4 1 1 0 8.83 1.86 
5 1 1 0 0 0 
6 1 1 0 0 0 
7 1 1 0 30 12 
8 1 1 0 13.95 13.95 
9 1 1 0 0 0 
10 1 1 0 6.74 2.34 
11 1 1 0 0 0 
12 1 1 0 13.01 8.72 
13 2 1 0 0 0 
14 1 1 0 7.21 1.86 
15 1 1 0 30 12 
16 1 1 0 4.07 2.09 
17 1 1 0 10.46 6.75 
18 1 1 0 3.72 1.05 
19 1 1 0 11.04 3.95 
20 2 1 0 2.56 0.82 
21 2 1 0 3.39 2.17 
22 1 1 0 0 0 
23 1 1 0 22.32 11.16 
24 1 1 0 10.11 7.79 
25 1 1 0 0 0 
26 1 1 0 4.06 2.67 
27 2 1 0 30 7.5 
28 1 1 0 0 0 
29 1 1 0 2.79 1.05 
30 1 1 0 10.6 1.9 
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Line Data for IEEE-30 bus system 
Line 
No. 
From To R (p.u.) X(p.u.) B(p.u.) 
Flow limit 
(MW) 
1 1 2 0.02 0.06 0.03 130 
2 1 3 0.05 0.19 0.02 130 
3 2 4 0.06 0.17 0.02 65 
4 3 4 0.01 0.04 0 130 
5 2 5 0.05 0.2 0.02 130 
6 2 6 0.06 0.18 0.02 65 
7 4 6 0.01 0.04 0 90 
8 5 7 0.05 0.12 0.01 70 
9 6 7 0.03 0.08 0.01 130 
10 6 8 0.01 0.04 0 32 
11 6 9 0 0.21 0 65 
12 6 10 0 0.56 0 32 
13 9 11 0 0.21 0 65 
14 9 10 0 0.11 0 65 
15 4 12 0 0.26 0 65 
16 12 13 0 0.14 0 65 
17 12 14 0.12 0.26 0 32 
18 12 15 0.07 0.13 0 32 
19 12 16 0.09 0.2 0 32 
20 14 15 0.22 0.2 0 16 
21 16 17 0.08 0.19 0 16 
22 15 18 0.11 0.22 0 16 
23 18 19 0.06 0.13 0 16 
24 19 20 0.03 0.07 0 32 
25 10 20 0.09 0.21 0 32 
26 10 17 0.03 0.08 0 32 
27 10 21 0.03 0.07 0 32 
28 10 22 0.07 0.15 0 32 
29 21 22 0.01 0.02 0 32 
30 15 23 0.1 0.2 0 16 
31 22 24 0.12 0.18 0 16 
32 23 24 0.13 0.27 0 16 
33 24 25 0.19 0.33 0 16 
34 25 26 0.25 0.38 0 16 
35 25 27 0.11 0.21 0 16 
36 28 27 0 0.4 0 65 
37 27 29 0.22 0.42 0 16 
38 27 30 0.32 0.6 0 16 
39 29 30 0.24 0.45 0 16 
40 8 28 0.06 0.2 0.02 32 
41 6 28 0.02 0.06 0.013 32 
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Generation Data of IEEE-30 bus system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gen 
No. 
Bus 
No. 
Pg(MW) Qg(MVAR) Qmax(MVAR) Qmin(MVAR) Pmax(MW) 
Pmin 
(MW) 
1 1 23.54 0 60 -15 60 0 
2 2 60.97 0 60 -15 60 0 
3 22 21.59 0 60 -15 60 0 
4 27 26.91 0 60 -15 60 0 
5 23 19.2 0 60 -15 60 0 
6 13 37 0 60 -15 60 0 
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APPENDIX B 
 
OPF Bus data without transmission constraints 
Bus 
No. 
Voltage Generation 
Load Lambda 
($/MVA-hr) 
Mag (pu) Angle 
P 
(MW) 
Q 
(MVAR) 
P 
(MW) 
Q 
(MVAR) 
P Q 
1 1.060 0 60 -0.22 0 0 71.768 0.001 
2 1.058 -0.911 60 24.50 5.04 2.96 72.435 0 
3 1.031 -2.989 - - 22.32 11.16 74.285 0.654 
4 1.032 -3.211 - - 8.83 1.86 74.490 0.615 
5 1.037 -2.953 - - 0 0 73.948 0.489 
6 1.028 -3.838 - - 0 0 75.114 0.637 
7 1.019 -4.123 - - 30 12 75.503 0.984 
8 1.022 -4.185 - - 13.95 13.95 75.465 0.781 
9 1.035 -4.335 - - 0 0 74.785 0.644 
10 1.039 -4.592 - - 6.74 2.34 74.614 0.650 
11 1.035 -4.335 - - 0 0 74.785 0.644 
12 1.038 -2.990 - - 13.01 8.72 74.318 0.599 
13 1.060 1.389 60 19.03 0 0 73.272 0 
14 1.023 -4.328 - - 7.21 1.86 74.876 1.093 
15 1.019 -4.736 - - 30 12 75.716 1.169 
16 1.030 -4.013 - - 4.07 2.09 74.40 0.905 
17 1.030 -4.664 - - 10.46 6.75 74.893 0.927 
18 1.011 -5.534 - - 3.72 1.05 76.603 1.416 
19 1.011 -5.774 - - 11.04 3.95 76.734 1.451 
20 1.017 -5.537 - - 2.56 0.82 76.278 1.283 
21 1.051 -4.467 - - 3.39 2.17 74.022 0.184 
22 1.056 -4.419 36 26.29 0 0 73.793 -0.001 
23 1.051 -4.469 41.67 24.05 22.32 11.16 74.227 0.002 
24 1.037 -5.949 - - 10.11 7.79 75.758 0.764 
25 1.033 -9.660 - - 0 0 78.433 0.626 
26 1.013 -10.140 - - 4.06 2.67 80.028 1.694 
27 1.044 -11.656 0 30.11 30 7.5 79.134 -0.001 
28 1.024 -4.764 - - 0 0 76.243 0.461 
29 1.023 -12.898 - - 2.79 1.05 81.303 0.616 
30 1.013 -13.711 - - 10.6 1.9 82.693 0.836 
  Total:     257.67     123.76     252.22     118.75   
 125   
 
OPF Branch data without transmission constraints 
Line 
No. 
From To 
From Bus Injection 
P(MW)     Q(MVAr) 
To  Bus Injection 
P(MW)   Q(MVAr) 
Loss (I^2 * Z) 
P(MW)  Q(MVAr) 
1 1 2 27.82 -7.35 -27.68 4.42 0.143 0.43 
2 1 3 32.18 7.13 -31.69 -7.45 0.491 1.87 
3 2 4 28.19 5.71 -27.74 -6.61 0.451 1.28 
4 3 4 9.37 -3.71 -9.36 3.75 0.010 0.04 
5 2 5 21.10 5.08 -20.89 -6.41 0.216 0.86 
6 2 6 33.34 6.34 -32.72 -6.64 0.626 1.88 
7 4 6 29.86 3.35 -29.78 -3.01 0.085 0.34 
8 5 7 20.89 6.41 -20.66 -6.93 0.225 0.54 
9 6 7 9.38 7.13 -9.34 -8.07 0.042 0.11 
10 6 8 18.58 10.74 -18.53 -10.56 0.044 0.17 
11 6 9 4.39 -3.46 -4.39 3.52 0.000 0.06 
12 6 10 2.51 -1.98 -2.51 2.03 0.000 0.05 
13 9 11 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.000 0.00 
14 9 10 4.39 -3.52 -4.39 3.55 0.000 0.03 
15 4 12 -1.59 -2.35 1.59 2.37 0.000 0.02 
16 12 13 -60.00 -14.10 60.00 19.03 0.000 4.94 
17 12 14 10.14 1.30 -10.02 -1.04 0.116 0.25 
18 12 15 25.74 1.78 -25.31 -0.98 0.433 0.80 
19 12 16 9.52 -0.06 -9.44 0.23 0.076 0.17 
20 14 15 2.81 -0.82 -2.79 0.83 0.018 0.02 
21 16 17 5.37 -2.32 -5.34 2.38 0.026 0.06 
22 15 18 6.60 0.14 -6.55 -0.05 0.046 0.09 
23 18 19 2.83 -1.00 -2.83 1.01 0.005 0.01 
24 19 20 -8.21 -4.96 8.24 5.02 0.027 0.06 
25 10 20 10.93 6.15 -10.80 -5.84 0.131 0.31 
26 10 17 5.15 9.22 -5.12 -9.13 0.031 0.08 
27 10 21 -9.60 -14.48 9.69 14.67 0.084 0.20 
28 10 22 -6.32 -8.81 6.39 8.97 0.076 0.16 
29 21 22 -13.08 -16.84 13.12 16.93 0.041 0.08 
30 15 23 -8.49 -12.00 8.70 12.42 0.208 0.42 
31 22 24 16.49 0.39 -16.20 0.05 0.293 0.44 
32 23 24 10.65 0.48 -10.51 -0.20 0.134 0.28 
33 24 25 16.60 -7.64 -16.01 8.66 0.590 1.03 
34 25 26 4.12 2.76 -4.06 -2.67 0.058 0.09 
35 25 27 11.89 -11.42 -11.61 11.96 0.280 0.54 
36 28 27 32.06 -3.20 -32.06 7.17 0.000 3.96 
37 27 29 6.45 1.78 -6.36 -1.61 0.090 0.17 
38 27 30 7.22 1.70 -7.06 -1.40 0.162 0.30 
39 29 30 3.57 0.56 -3.54 -0.50 0.030 0.06 
40 8 28 4.58 -3.39 -4.57 1.35 0.015 0.05 
41 6 28 27.64 -2.79 -27.49 1.86 0.145 0.44 
      Total:      5.449      22.69 
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APPENDIX C 
 
OPF Bus data with transmission constraints 
Bus 
No. 
Voltage Generation 
Load Lambda 
($/MVA-hr) 
Mag (pu) Angle 
P 
(MW) 
Q 
(MVAR) 
P 
(MW) 
Q 
(MVAR) 
P Q 
1 1.060 0 60 -0.22 0 0 71.768 0.001 
2 1.058 -0.911 60 24.50 5.04 2.96 72.435 0 
3 1.031 -2.989 - - 22.32 11.16 74.285 0.654 
4 1.032 -3.211 - - 8.83 1.86 74.490 0.615 
5 1.037 -2.953 - - 0 0 73.948 0.489 
6 1.028 -3.838 - - 0 0 75.114 0.637 
7 1.019 -4.123 - - 30 12 75.503 0.984 
8 1.022 -4.185 - - 13.95 13.95 75.465 0.781 
9 1.035 -4.335 - - 0 0 74.785 0.644 
10 1.039 -4.592 - - 6.74 2.34 74.614 0.650 
11 1.035 -4.335 - - 0 0 74.785 0.644 
12 1.038 -2.990 - - 13.01 8.72 74.318 0.599 
13 1.060 1.389 60 19.03 0 0 73.272 0 
14 1.023 -4.328 - - 7.21 1.86 74.876 1.093 
15 1.019 -4.736 - - 30 12 75.716 1.169 
16 1.030 -4.013 - - 4.07 2.09 74.40 0.905 
17 1.030 -4.664 - - 10.46 6.75 74.893 0.927 
18 1.011 -5.534 - - 3.72 1.05 76.603 1.416 
19 1.011 -5.774 - - 11.04 3.95 76.734 1.451 
20 1.017 -5.537 - - 2.56 0.82 76.278 1.283 
21 1.051 -4.467 - - 3.39 2.17 74.022 0.184 
22 1.056 -4.419 36 26.29 0 0 73.793 -0.001 
23 1.051 -4.469 41.67 24.05 22.32 11.16 74.227 0.002 
24 1.037 -5.949 - - 10.11 7.79 75.758 0.764 
25 1.033 -9.660 - - 0 0 78.433 0.626 
26 1.013 -10.140 - - 4.06 2.67 80.028 1.694 
27 1.044 -11.656 0 30.11 30 7.5 79.134 -0.001 
28 1.024 -4.764 - - 0 0 76.243 0.461 
29 1.023 -12.898 - - 2.79 1.05 81.303 0.616 
30 1.013 -13.711 - - 10.6 1.9 82.693 0.836 
  Total:     257.30        122.15      252.22        118.75   
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OPF Branch data with transmission constraints 
Line 
No. 
From To 
From Bus Injection 
P(MW)     Q(MVAr) 
To  Bus Injection 
P(MW)       
Q(MVAr) 
Loss (I^2 * Z) 
P(MW)   
Q(MVAr) 
1 1 2 28.30 -7.62 -28.15 4.70 0.149 0.45 
2 1 3 31.70 7.24 -31.23 -7.61 0.478 1.82 
3 2 4 27.42 6.01 -26.99 -6.97 0.430 1.22 
4 3 4 8.91 -3.55 -8.90 3.59 0.009 0.03 
5 2 5 20.60 5.25 -20.39 -6.62 0.208 0.83 
6 2 6 32.23 6.74 -31.64 -7.15 0.590 1.77 
7 4 6 28.12 3.90 -28.05 -3.60 0.076 0.30 
8 5 7 20.39 6.62 -20.18 -7.15 0.217 0.52 
9 6 7 9.87 6.92 -9.82 -7.85 0.043 0.12 
10 6 8 17.94 10.70 -17.90 -10.54 0.041 0.17 
11 6 9 4.32 -2.59 -4.32 2.64 0.000 0.05 
12 6 10 2.47 -1.48 -2.47 1.52 0.000 0.04 
13 9 11 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.000 0.00 
14 9 10 4.32 -2.64 -4.32 2.67 0.000 0.03 
15 4 12 -1.07 -2.37 1.07 2.39 0.000 0.02 
16 12 13 -60.00 -14.07 60.00 19.01 0.000 4.94 
17 12 14 10.27 1.13 -10.15 -0.87 0.119 0.26 
18 12 15 26.34 1.20 -25.89 -0.36 0.452 0.84 
19 12 16 9.31 0.63 -9.24 -0.47 0.073 0.16 
20 14 15 2.94 -0.99 -2.92 1.01 0.020 0.02 
21 16 17 5.17 -1.62 -5.15 1.67 0.022 0.05 
22 15 18 6.36 0.77 -6.32 -0.68 0.043 0.09 
23 18 19 2.60 -0.37 -2.59 0.38 0.004 0.01 
24 19 20 -8.45 -4.33 8.47 4.39 0.027 0.06 
25 10 20 11.16 5.51 -11.03 -5.21 0.130 0.30 
26 10 17 5.34 8.49 -5.31 -8.42 0.028 0.08 
27 10 21 -9.95 -12.76 10.03 12.93 0.073 0.17 
28 10 22 -6.51 -7.78 6.57 7.92 0.067 0.14 
29 21 22 -13.42 -15.10 13.45 15.17 0.037 0.07 
30 15 23 -7.55 -13.41 7.78 13.87 0.228 0.46 
31 22 24 15.97 -0.92 -15.70 1.33 0.278 0.42 
32 23 24 9.03 2.59 -8.92 -2.38 0.103 0.21 
33 24 25 14.51 -6.75 -14.05 7.54 0.454 0.79 
34 25 26 4.12 2.76 -4.06 -2.67 0.058 0.09 
35 25 27 9.94 -10.29 -9.72 10.70 0.211 0.40 
36 28 27 28.91 -3.16 -28.91 6.38 0.000 3.23 
37 27 29 6.45 1.78 -6.36 -1.61 0.091 0.17 
38 27 30 7.22 1.70 -7.06 -1.40 0.162 0.30 
39 29 30 3.57 0.56 -3.54 -0.50 0.030 0.06 
40 8 28 3.95 -3.41 -3.93 1.36 0.012 0.04 
41 6 28 25.10 -2.81 -24.98 1.80 0.120 0.36 
      Total:      5.083      21.08 
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Branch Flow Constraints 
Line No. 
From 
Bus 
From MW  End 
MW 
Limit 
To MW      End 
MW 
To  
Bus 
31 22 17.598 16 16 15.75 - 24 
33 24 17.453 16 16 15.95 - 25 
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APPENDIX D 
 
SETTLEMENT OF CONTRACTS 
Case2. When LSE at bus 27 undertake a contract with one of the available generators: 
LSE at bus 27 pays                    to MO for extracting 25 MW at bus 27. 
Generator at bus 13 receives                     from MO for injecting 25 MW 
at bus13. 
LSE at bus 27 pays                         to Generator at bus 13 to settle the 
contract for difference. 
LSE at bus 27 collects                             from MO for the FTRs it 
owns between bus 13 and bus 27. 
Thus, LSE at bus 27 pays       for 25 MW which is equivalent to a price of          
Case3. When LSE at bus 27 undertake contracts with more than one available generator: 
1. Between LSE at bus 27 and generator at bus 13 
 
LSE at bus 27 pays                     to MO for extracting 26 MW at bus 27. 
Generator at bus 13 receives                     from MO for injecting 26 MW 
at bus13. 
LSE at bus 27 pays                         to Generator at bus 13 to settle the 
contract for difference. 
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LSE at bus 27 collects                             from MO for the FTRs it 
owns between bus 13 and bus 27. 
Thus, LSE at bus 27 pays       for 26 MW which is equivalent to a price of      
     
 
2. Between LSE at bus 27 and generator at bus 23  
 
LSE at bus 27 pays                   to MO for extracting 4 MW at bus 27. 
Generator at bus 13 receives                   from MO for injecting 4 MW at 
bus13. 
LSE at bus 27 pays                       to Generator at bus 13 to settle the 
contract for difference. 
LSE at bus 27 collects                          from MO for the FTRs it owns 
between bus 13 and bus 27. 
Thus, LSE at bus 27 pays      for 4 MW which is equivalent to a price of          
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
Abbreviation            Full form 
Genco     Generation Company 
LSE     Load Serving Entity 
ISO     Independent System Operator 
MO     Market Operator 
MCP     Market Clearing Price 
PAB     Pay-As-Bid 
SBB     Single Bidding Block  
TBB     Three Bidding Block 
GA     Genetic Algorithm 
DSP     Demand Side Participation 
LAO     Last Accepted Offer 
FRO     First Rejected Offer 
LAB     Last Accepted Bid 
FRB     First Rejected Bid 
OPF     Optimal Power Flow 
LMP     Locational Marginal Price 
ZMCP     Zonal Market Clearing Price 
NP     Nodal Price 
FTRs     Financial Transmission Rights 
FGRs     Flow Gate Rights 
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